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∎ Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign 
Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of 
protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlan-
tic partner. 
∎ Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favour 
of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral 
dependence, even among friends, comes at a price. This timeless incentive 
is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or 
without Trump; China’s twofold challenge; an emerging Sino-American 
rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron’s offer to his 
European partners. 
∎ European self-defence has to meet four key requirements: broader and 
greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective 
strategy, and political leadership. 
∎ Defence autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. 
In the case of the EU, neither primary deterrence, reserved for a single 
state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, 
would be adequate. 
∎ Instead, Europe would have to create a novel type of “integrated deter-
rence”. Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this 
would be based on French nuclear forces, with the French president main-
taining exclusive decision-making authority. 
∎ Germany and France would have to seize the initiative by “taking their bi-
lateral relations to a new level”, as stated in the Aachen Treaty of January 
22, 2019. They would have to lead by example, bring about the progres-
sive integration of their armed forces and an alignment of their strategic 
cultures. 
∎ This would demand a great deal of Germany in terms of defence spending 
and redefining its “culture of military restraint”. To initiate such a process 
of rethinking and repositioning will require an open-minded debate on 
the role of the military for a Europe that “takes its fate into its own hands” 
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Issues and Conclusions 
Standing on Our Own Feet? 
Opportunities and Risks of 
European Self-Defence 
One of the lessons from the corona pandemic is that 
latent dependencies can quickly and painfully become 
acute. This was brought home to EU Member States 
when they suffered sudden supply shortages of medi-
cal protective clothing, face masks, and drugs imported 
from Asia, demonstrating their lack of sovereignty in 
an area vital to the well-being of their citizens. 
Sovereignty, however, is never absolute. No one is 
fully independent, completely invulnerable or omni-
potent. Rather, in situations of mutual interdepend-
ence, an actor’s sovereignty increases or decreases 
with its ability to ensure a balanced distribution of 
dependencies. Hence, a sovereign actor is one who 
can either ensure that interdependencies are symmet-
rical or sever its dependency on others at an accept-
able loss of security and prosperity. 
In this sense, the sovereignty of EU nation-states 
rests on a united Europe serving as a power multi-
plier. By global standards, even major European 
powers such as France and Germany are no more 
than middleweights. Only Europe’s collective power 
can ensure status parity, i.e., power symmetry with 
other global players, be they states or non-state 
entities, such as companies. 
The corona crisis has heightened public and politi-
cal awareness of the need to harness Europe’s collec-
tive power for its economic, technological, and digital 
sovereignty. Even if this were achieved, however, there 
would still be an Achilles’ heel as long as Europe’s 
defence continues to depend on American protection. 
Yet only a Europe capable of providing for its own 
defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. 
This study explores whether and how such a capac-
ity for self-defence could be achieved. In addition to dis-
cussing the feasibility of European defence autonomy, 
the issue of desirability will be addressed, as well. 
Prima facie, the latter appears self-evident since sover-
eignty enables an actor to assert their interests and 
promote their values, either in cooperation with or 
in opposition to others. However, when it comes to 
defence, ultimately national or collective survival is 
at stake. Since the founding of the North Atlantic 
alliance (NATO) in 1949, Europe has relied on the US 
Issues and Conclusions 
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for its security. Shedding this dependence can and 
should only be embarked upon if the associated risks 
can be contained and the benefits outweigh the costs. 
Consequently, the main part of this study is devoted 
to an in-depth analysis of both the feasibility and desir-
ability of European defence autonomy. 
To this end, I will first define the key terms. Euro-
pean defence sovereignty implies neither autarky nor 
a dissolution of NATO and the transatlantic security 
partnership. The objective is status parity within NATO 
through symmetric interdependence between Europe 
and the U.S. 
Chapter 2 sets out why it is important to put the 
issue back on the political agenda. Structurally, uni-
lateral dependencies, even among friends, entail 
vulnerability and come at a price. Five developments 
have heightened Europe’s dependency and increased 
its associated costs: transatlantic rifts, Chinese asser-
tiveness, Sino-American rivalry, Putin’s Russia, and 
global disorder. 
In the third and main chapter, three issues are ad-
dressed: What is required for European autonomy 
(“What must be done?”), what is achievable (“What 
could be done?”), and what is desirable (“What should 
be done?”). 
There are four essential requirements for a Euro-
pean self-defence posture: a solid foundation of politi-
cal, economic, cultural, and military integration; suf-
ficient military capabilities; a resilient political-mili-
tary strategy, and determined political leadership. 
These four criteria are used to discuss the attain-
ability of European defence autonomy (“What could 
be done”?). For the foreseeable future, such autonomy 
will require a nuclear deterrent component. In politi-
cal and military terms, fulfilling this requirement is 
the toughest challenge. Meeting it will only be pos-
sible if Europe succeeds in devising a novel type of 
nuclear deterrence. To date, there have been two kinds: 
primary deterrence, whose protective perimeter is con-
fined to the homeland of a nuclear-armed state, and 
extended deterrence, where a nuclear-armed state aims 
at protecting not just itself but also an ally with 
threats of nuclear use directed at a third party. 
Since NATO’s inception, Europe has relied on ex-
tended deterrence provided by its U.S. ally. For Europe 
to stand on its own feet when it comes to deterrence, 
it would have to develop a substitute located some-
where between primary and extended deterrence. This 
could be referred to as integrated deterrence and would 
correspond with the hybrid nature of the European 
Union, comprising both inter- and supranational pil-
lars. Integrated deterrence would necessitate deepen-
ing and broadening European integration to a point 
where the French nuclear deterrent was Europeanised 
without affecting the decision-making sovereignty of 
the French president. 
As envisaged by President Kennedy in 1962, Euro-
pean defence autonomy would be achieved in coordi-
nation with the United States and it would aim at 
reinforcing NATO through a fully-fledged European 
pillar. However, as not all EU Member States will 
want to go down this path from the outset, the initia-
tive would have to come from Germany and France 
as Europe’s critical mass. In the Aachen Treaty of 
22 January 2019, the two countries affirmed their 
willingness to “take their bilateral relations to a new 
level”, which would have to involve a gradual merg-
ing of their military resources and cultures. Through 
their exemplary bilateral integration and their endur-
ing commitment to European integration at large, 
France and Germany would attempt to win over other 
EU Member States. 
To succeed, they would have to defuse concerns 
and refute the arguments advanced by critics of Euro-
pean self-reliance. Five such objections are discussed 
in the section “What should be done”: fragmentary 
European identity; insufficient resources; lack of cred-
ibility of French nuclear protection; a perilous transi-
tion from American protection to European autonomy; 
and splitting Europe into proponents and opponents 
of defence autonomy. 
The three analytical steps of “What must be done”, 
“What could be done” and “What should be done” 
allow for a rigorous analysis of the requirements and 
challenges, the benefits and costs of European self-
defence. However, they cannot provide a definitive 
answer regarding the balance of opportunities and 
risks. Any such assessment is inherently subjective, 
just as policy conclusions are determined by political 
preferences as well as electoral politics. 
In light of this, the author presents his own view in 
the final chapter. A vision degenerates into delusion 
if it consists of mere voluntarism. “In foreign policy, a 
realist without imagination is a dullard. But if one is 
not also a realist, one is just a dreamer.” (Willy Brandt). 
Following this precept, the study concludes by ex-
pounding the rationale for and mapping out a path 
to a Europe that would stand on its own defence feet 
and thus achieve full sovereignty. 
 European Self-Defence: What It Means and What It Doesn’t 
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Whether nightmare or pipe dream – if European 
self-defence is coupled with an unattainable objective 
it amounts to a flight of fancy. 
This would be the case if self-defence, or its con-
ceptual counterpart autonomy, were equated with 
autarchy, which, in an interdependent world, is 
neither possible nor desirable.1 Ultimately, no one is 
autarchic, i.e., completely invulnerable and entirely 
self-sufficient. This is not only true with regard to 
military or terrorist threats. Protecting from global 
climate change and pandemics or decoupling from 
international trade, data flows, and supply chains 
are either simply impossible or too costly. 
Furthermore, defence autonomy does not require 
independence. Consequently, European self-defence 
should not and need not lead to NATO’s dissolution. 
Instead, the alliance could be based on an American 
and a European pillar, as envisaged by President 
Kennedy in his speech on 4 July 1962. 
Although there was no explicit mention of NATO, 
the president’s offer and invitation to the “nations 
of Western Europe” were clear. The United States 
did not see a strong and united Europe as a rival, 
but as a partner “with whom we can deal on a basis 
of full equality”. It would take time to create such 
an Atlantic partnership, but, to pave the way for it, 
Kennedy announced “on this Day of Independence, 
that the United States will be ready for a Declaration 
of Interdependence” with a united Europe.2 
Recalling Kennedy’s invitation highlights the 
extent of transatlantic estrangement under a Presi-
 
1 Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker 
Perthes, eds., European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts 
of Interests, SWP Research Paper 4/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, March 2019), 5. 
2 John F. Kennedy, “Address at Independence Hall Phil-
adelphia”, Pennsylvania, 4 July 1962, https://www.jfklibrary. 
org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/ 
philadelphia-pa-19620704 (accessed 20 February 2020). 
dent Trump who sees Europe as a rival rather than a 
partner. However, in the present context, Kennedy’s 
address makes another, more important point. The 
speech provides two crucial notions for defining Euro-
pean self-defence: partnership among equals and 
interdependence. European sovereignty in defence is 
not synonymous with a declaration of independence 
from the USA. It is about status parity with the U.S. 
through symmetrical interdependence. 
NATO: Not to be dismantled, 
but rebuilt. 
Such parity does not exist today and indeed never 
has. NATO has always been characterised by asym-
metrical interdependence: Europe needs the U.S. far 
more than Washington needs its European allies. Cer-
tainly, NATO is still of great value to the U.S., includ-
ing the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Europe 
that can also be used for non-NATO missions. Never-
theless, there remains a fundamental disparity: the 
U.S. is able to protect itself independently, while 
Europe does not have the same autonomy as it relies 
on U.S. assistance for safeguarding its existential 
security. 
American-style autonomy goes beyond deterrence 
or defence against an armed attack on its own terri-
tory or that of an ally. In addition to territorial 
defence, it includes the ability and willingness to use 
military means in a host of other contingencies: to 
contain and resolve conflicts that might foster terror-
ism and result in refugee flows; to contribute to 
multinational peace missions; to protect trade and 
communication routes; to enforce embargoes and 
sanctions; or to evacuate and rescue one’s own citi-
zens. These and other forms of extended self-defence 
may come into play not only when a country’s own 
well-being is in acute danger. They might also apply 
to situations in which protecting against the ramifi-
cations of potential long-term threats such as global 
European Self-Defence: What 
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warming is not a practicable option, or turning a 
blind eye to suffering and need is not a morally 
acceptable option. Moreover, Germany and Europe 
benefit enormously from global trade, cross-border 
investment, and unrestricted communication. They 
therefore have a fundamental interest in effective 
and rules-based institutions and regimes with 
regional or global capacity to manage positive and 
negative interdependencies. However, if we do not 
want might to trump right, rules have to be set and 
enforced, and the latter may also require military 
means. 
 Why Revisit the Topic of European Self-Defence? 
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For decades, Europe has fared well under the protec-
tion provided by its American guardian.3 This is par-
ticularly true for Germany. During the Cold War, the 
country was extremely vulnerable due to division and 
its frontline position; any military escalation of the 
East-West confrontation could have had devastating 
consequences for both of its states. The American 
protector as the backbone of NATO not only offered 
protection from the Soviet Union, but also from a 
recovering (West) Germany. This facilitated the Euro-
pean integration process, which, in turn, favoured 
the sovereignty of the West German state and its “eco-
nomic miracle”. This process, NATO integration, and 
strong support from Washington were decisive for 
German reunification. The German Ministry of De-
fence’s White Paper of 2016 still states unequivocally: 
“The transatlantic alliance is vital to the security 
of Europe. Only together with the United States can 
Europe effectively defend itself against the threats 
of the 21st century and guarantee a credible form 
of deterrence.”4 
Nevertheless, due to recent developments as well 
as a specific structural reason, the issue of a Europe 
standing on its own feet is back on the political agenda. 
The aforementioned structural reason relates to the 
asymmetrical nature of transatlantic interdepend-
ence. Unilateral dependency causes vulnerabilities 
 
3 While he regarded this state of affairs as untenable in the 
long run, Egon Bahr nonetheless did not hesitate to point 
out its secure and beneficial nature: “There are worse things 
than the luxurious protectorate, which offers Europe such 
generous co-determination and under which American bases 
really do not hurt at all.” (Egon Bahr, Deutsche Interessen. Streit-
schrift zu Macht, Sicherheit und Außenpolitik [Munich: Blessing, 
1998], 36–37 – my translation.) 
4 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ed., White Paper 
2016 on German Security Policy and The Future of the Bundeswehr 
(Berlin, June 2016), 49, https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/ 
111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf (accessed 
31 October 2020). 
and comes at a price, even among friends. This is 
demonstrated by recurrent NATO controversies about 
risk- and burden-sharing and persistent European and 
especially German concerns regarding the possibility 
of Washington not honouring its defence commit-
ments or doing so at the expense of its allies. 
The implications of asymmetry can be particularly 
worrying when the nuclear dimension comes into 
play. Ever since the U.S. became vulnerable to a de-
vastating Soviet or Russian nuclear strike, American 
presidents have all had to give the survival of their 
own country precedence over the security of Euro-
pean allies. Fortunately, whether or not the escalatory 
dynamics of a war that would leave Europe devastated 
but spare U.S. territory could be reined in has never 
been put to the test and thus far remains a hypotheti-
cal question. However, no pre-war arrangements (such 
as the establishment of forward bases for American 
troops and matériel in Europe) and no American 
pledge of allegiance can eliminate the fundamental 
difference between primary and extended deterrence. 
Primary or homeland deterrence is reserved for a nu-
clear power’s own survival. Only then is such deter-
rence unconditional: If a country has nothing to lose 
because its own survival is directly threatened, an 
attacker must reckon with the possibility of a tit-for-
tat response threatening his existence as well. How-
ever, if the initial attack is directed only against an 
ally, a nuclear protector’s response is conditional, i.e., 
guided by a country’s supreme interest in preventing 
escalation to a destructive all-out war. Herein lies the 
difference between a nuclear guarantee (= original 
deterrence), which Washington’s European allies have 
never had, and a nuclear commitment (= extended 
deterrence), which is what underpins the mutual 
assistance clause of the NATO Treaty (Article 5).5 
 
5 Otherwise, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would not have 
triggered the debate about an alleged gap in NATO’s nuclear 
response options in the late 1970s. In his view, the Soviet 
Why Revisit the Topic of 
European Self-Defence? 
Why Revisit the Topic of European Self-Defence? 
SWP Berlin 
Standing on Our Own Feet? 
February 2021 
10 
That said, America’s nuclear commitment is by no 
means a loose arrangement. It has fulfilled its twofold 
purpose of deterring a potential attacker and reassur-
ing European allies. It derives its credibility from 
America’s strategic interest in the physical integrity, 
economic wellbeing, and cooperation of its allies, 
underpinned by a military presence on the territory 
of its partners. In essence, this has been NATO’s for-
mula for success for 70 years. 
The longevity of this alliance structure is all the 
more remarkable given that from the point of view 
of the protégé, extended deterrence is a second-best 
solution to their security predicament: they have no 
control over whether and how the commitment is 
honoured and have to assume that if it ever came to 
the crunch, the protector’s own survival would be 
paramount. 
Recent developments exacerbate 
the structural ambivalence of 
extended deterrence. 
Linked to this are the pre-war costs and risks asso-
ciated with asymmetrical interdependence. In con-
junction with deep-rooted concerns about potential 
victimisation in war they are the structural source 
of aspirations to establish status parity with the U.S.6 
Such aspirations have been reinforced and revitalised 
by six specific developments. 
 
SS-20 intermediate-range missiles were “euro-strategic weap-
ons” because they posed an existential threat to Western 
Europe but not the United States. If Europe had an American 
nuclear guarantee, i.e., if it were protected by primary deter-
rence, the SS-20s would have been categorised as “strategic” 
in light of the Soviet intercontinental missiles that could 
reach the U.S. homeland. As a corollary, Washington would 
have insisted that they be incorporated into strategic arms 
control accords with the Soviet Union or Russia. 
6 It should be noted that this applies to both sides. While 
extended deterrence is a second-best solution in the eyes of 
those benefitting from it, it is equally true that for the U.S., 
too, its commitment is by no means risk and cost free. Hence, 
the optimal solution for both sides would be a Europe 
capable of providing for its defence without American assis-
tance. However, Washington would then have to accept no 
longer being “primus inter pares” within NATO. 
Trump or no Trump – the old West 
is dead 
All in all, the transatlantic community remained 
intact during the Cold War, despite recurring dis-
putes. It also survived the fall of the Berlin wall, 
which removed the unifying force of the East-West 
confrontation. The United States and Europe have 
always had more in common than just economic and 
security interests; they are also bound by a unique web 
of shared values and history, of cultural and human 
closeness. 
Behaving like a “demolition man”, President Trump 
has strained transatlantic relations like no other 
leader before him.7 Trump is neither a realist nor an 
idealist, he is an opportunist: preserving values and 
observing rules are contingent on their functional 
utility for promoting “America First”, which he equates 
with “Trump First”. America’s allies are no longer 
treated as such. Trump does not seek partnership, 
but expects allegiance. He appears to be the first U.S. 
president to call the EU “a foe”.8 In 2018, he reported-
ly raised the issue of the U.S. leaving NATO on several 
occasions.9 He has dealt several blows to multilateral-
ism, including terminating American adherence to the 
Paris climate accord and the nuclear deal with Iran, 
employing the global predominance of the dollar to 
undermine the latter and isolate Iran. 
Trump is a disaster, but not an accident. Even if 
he is to be ousted and succeeded by Biden – the old 
West will not return. This is not solely due to the 
harm inflicted and the loss of confidence caused by 
Trump. Even more important are four long-term fac-
tors that made a Trump presidency possible in the 
first place: a deeply divided American society and 
polarised politics, demographic changes, the fall-out 
 
7 For the term “demolition man”, see “Donald Trump’s 
Demolition Theory of Foreign Policy Won’t Work”, The 
Economist, 9 June 2018, 13. 
8 Trump said in a CBS interview on July 2018: “Now, you 
wouldn’t think of the European Union, but they’re a foe.” 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-interview-cbs-
news-european-union-is-a-foe-ahead-of-putin-meeting-in-
helsinki-jeff-glor/ (accessed 1 November 2020). 
9 See Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper “Trump Dis-
cussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Con-
cerns over Russia”, The New York Times, 14 January 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-
president-trump.html (accessed 21 February 2020). 
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of the corona pandemic and the shift in Washington’s 
geostrategic focus.10 
America’s innate talents and dynamism, fuelled by 
optimism and pragmatism, should not be discounted. 
But whether the wounds aggravated by Trump will heal 
remains uncertain and if they do, it will take time. 
Even then, the socio-political complexion of the 
United States is changing, not least because of demo-
graphic shifts. The proportion of the population with 
a European migration background has shrunk dras-
tically, for instance.11 In addition, there has been a 
reorientation of domestic and foreign policy. The 
country is beset by social and political cleavages that 
sap its global power and standing. These have been 
compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic and address-
ing them will tie up enormous resources. As a result, 
the inward orientation of American policy is likely to 
intensify regardless of the outcome of the November 
elections.12 Until the collapse of Soviet communism, 
the East-West conflict had provided the glue of trans-
atlantic cohesion. In the wake of its disappearance, 
 
10 Kirsten Westphal points to another factor: the impact of 
the fracking boom in the USA. “The West as an ‘energy com-
munity’ has ceased to exist [...] The new situation of Ameri-
can energy abundance has deprived the alliance of interests 
of its essential basis” (Kirsten Westphal, Strategische Souveräni-
tät in Energiefragen. Überlegungen zur Handlungs- und Gestaltungs-
fähigkeit Deutschlands in der EU, SWP-Aktuell 46/2020 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2020, 4, https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/ 
2020A46_energiesouveraenitaet.pdf [accessed 15 July 2020]). 
11 “Europe inevitably counts for less in American eyes 
than it once did. The generation that formed bonds fighting 
side-by-side in the second world war is passing away and 
even the cold war is becoming a distant memory. Mean-
while, America is becoming less European. A century ago 
more than 80% of its foreign born population came from 
Europe; now the figure is only 10%” (“Europe and America 
Must Work to Stop Their Relationship Unravelling”, The 
Economist, 26 March 2019, 12). 
12 “Rather, the United States’ withdrawal from many 
stages of world politics is likely to continue. For Covid-19 
relentlessly exposes America’s weaknesses, not least in the 
health care system. And the recession weighs heavily on 
the country. To remedy the weaknesses and to overcome 
the recession, America will focus even more resources and 
energy on its inner workings.” (Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, 
“Trumps Kriegsmodus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung 
[FAS], 29 March 2020, 8 – my translation). 
Europe’s strategic importance to the United States 
has dwindled.13 
These four factors need not lead to a complete 
American withdrawal from Europe. But taken to-
gether, they will ensure that American resources and 
interests will increasingly be directed toward Asia in 
general and China in particular, fuelled by an expec-
tation that by now, Europe should be rich enough 
and mature enough to stand on its own feet. Trump 
has not minced his words in this respect. Just because 
Trump says it, however, does not mean it should be 
ignored.14 
Trump’s deranged behaviour will not become the 
presidential norm. Nonetheless, the transatlantic 
community of yesteryear cannot be resurrected, and 
building a new and lasting partnership will only be 
possible with a stronger Europe ready to take on more 
responsibility within it.15 
China’s twofold challenge 
Within a single generation, China has catapulted 
itself into the position of a world power. It is the only 
country that has the potential not only to reach power 
 
13 “The United States’ focus on Europe is declining – that 
will be the case under any president.” (Chancellor Merkel, 
interview with Financial Times [FT], 16 January 2020, 7). 
14 Indeed, he was not the first to complain about European 
“free-riders”. See, for example, “Remarks by Secretary Gates 
at the Security and Defence Agenda, Brussels, Belgium, 
10 June 2011”, https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Tran 
script.aspx?TranscriptID=4839 and President Obama, The 
Atlantic, April 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (accessed 21 
February 2020). 
15 “But Biden’s commitment to transatlantic relations will 
not magically reverse the trends that contributed to Trump’s 
election in the first place – populism, anti-globalization, and 
resentment of the costs of U.S. leadership – and that have 
driven the two sides of the Atlantic apart in recent years. A 
President Biden will need to walk a fine line between pro-
viding more support for European allies and insisting that 
they take on greater responsibilities – for defense, for secu-
rity in their region, and for internal European cohesion.” 
(Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, “The Atlantic Alliance 
Had Pre-existing Conditions. The Pandemic Will Worsen 
Them”, War on the Rocks, 13 April 2020, https://waronthe 
rocks.com/2020/04/the-atlantic-alliance-had-preexisting-
conditions-the-pandemic-will-worsen-them/ [accessed 8 June 
2020].) 
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parity with the United States, but even to outstrip 
it in terms of economic and technological might.16 
Yet China presents more than just a geopolitical 
challenge. China’s communist autocracy sees itself as 
a systemic alternative to a Western-style combination 
of capitalism and democracy. The Chinese leader-
ship’s explicit aim is to prove that a highly productive 
and innovative economy controlled by the state can 
go hand in hand with political authoritarianism. 
The dual challenge posed by China has left its 
mark in Washington. China is one of the few issues 
on which the usually deeply divided Republicans and 
Democrats are agreed. The country is viewed as a 
global rival that must be kept in check by counter-
vailing power. 
The U.S. administration is not alone in this. At a 
meeting in London in December 2019, for the first 
time ever NATO members not only discussed the 
opportunities, but also the challenges resulting from 
China’s rise.17 Similarly, in 2019, the EU Commission 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy classified China as a part-
ner as well as an economic competitor and systemic 
rival.18 This ambivalence was also reflected in a paper 
issued by the Association of German Industry: the 
country remains an important sales and procurement 
market, but it is closing off markets and disadvantag-
 
16 Based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP), China’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) became the world’s largest in 2013, 
its GDP per capita has risen tenfold since 1990. As a result, 
the global centre of economic gravity, which in 1980 was 
still located in the Atlantic Ocean off Norway had moved to 
Siberia in 2018. (“The Chinese century is well under way”, 
The Economist, 27 January 2018, 81). 
17 NATO London Declaration, 3–4 December 2019, https:// 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm 
(accessed 22 February 2020). 
18 “China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a 
cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned 
objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs 
to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in 
the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival 
promoting alternative models of governance.” (European 
Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, 
Strasbourg, 12 March 2019, 1 https://ec.europa.eu/ commis-
sion/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-
strategic-outlook.pdf [accessed 22 February 2020]). 
ing non-Chinese companies, while the party’s claim 
to control society and the economy is growing.19 
This claim is linked to the repression of opponents, 
oppression of minorities such as the Uighurs, and 
reining in of Hong Kong in breach of the agreement 
concluded with the United Kingdom in 1997. China 
pursues a hegemonic policy in its region by, for exam-
ple, laying claim to islets and waters in the South 
China Sea in defiance of international arbitration 
panels. It is expanding its global reach through the 
Belt and Road initiative as well as financial invest-
ment and loan arrangements. 
A new bipolarity is emerging 
East-West bipolarity was the defining characteristic of 
the second half of the 20th century in the Euro-Atlan-
tic region. The 21st century could be a Pacific century, 
with China and the U.S. the two opposing poles. 
However, Sino-American bipolarity is not a forgone 
conclusion. If it were able to muster the political will, 
a united Europe has the resources to be a third pole. 
After decades of uninterrupted growth, China could 
stumble: its population will age dramatically, its 
labour force will shrink as a result of the one-child 
policy, its growth will have to rely less on exports and 
investment and more on domestic demand with falling 
savings rates, many companies are heavily indebted, 
and the jury is still out on whether an autocracy that 
deprives citizens of fundamental political rights is 
compatible with an innovative and knowledge-based 
economy.20 Furthermore, if Chinese leaders succumb 
to the temptation to flex their country’s muscles in 
Asia and beyond, they could stir up mistrust and 
resistance to Chinese influence. 
Thus, China is not invulnerable, and its continued 
rise is not inevitable. Similarly, as 2008 showed, 
the United States and debt-fuelled capitalism are not 
immune to major economic and financial crises.21 
 
19 See Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Partner 
und systemischer Wettbewerber – Wie gehen wir mit Chinas staatlich 
gelenkter Volkswirtschaft um? (Berlin, January 2019), 2–4.  
20 See “Can Pandas Fly?”, The Economist, 23 February 2019, 
11/43–48, as well as “Red Moon Rising” and “Chinese 
Science: The Great Experiment”, The Economist, 12 January 
2019, 9 and 64–68, respectively. 
21 See Institute of International Finance, Global Debt Moni-
tor: High Debt May Exacerbate Climate Risk (Washington, D.C., 
14 November 2019), and Markus Frühauf and Winand von 
Petersdorff-Campen, “So viele Staatsschulden wir nie. Auch 
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Nevertheless, power relations do not change over-
night or as a result of a global pandemic. Moreover, 
China and the U.S. are such heavyweights that no 
country would be spared if even one of them were 
to fall prey to turmoil or even collapse. 
Therefore, their development and their bilateral 
relationship will crucially determine the global 
(dis-)order of the 21st century. If the EU fails to form 
a third power pole, a new bipolarity will emerge 
where Europe will find it difficult to hold its own. 
The U.S. as well as China would then be tempted to 
press Europe to take their side in the mutual rivalry.22 
Europe will lean towards Washington for historical 
reasons and based on their congruent values and 
interests. But it will only be able to stand its ground 
in a transatlantic partnership of equals. Unless it can 
provide for its own defence, such confidence will 
elude Europe. 
Paradoxically, Europe’s defence-related vulnerabil-
ity could increase as it achieves status parity in other 
areas. President Trump was able to undermine the 
nuclear agreement with Iran because the dollar is the 
global currency and access to the vast American mar-
ket is vitally important to companies and exporters 
worldwide.23 A Europe with a euro currency strong 
enough to challenge American “financial hegemony”24 
 
Unternehmen doppelt so hoch verschuldet wie in der Fi-
nanzkrise”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 22 February 
2020, 17. 
22 “Washington will probably perceive the world, and thus 
Europe as well, primarily through a ‘China prism’ [...] How-
ever, Washington’s pressure on its allies to take a position 
in the intensifying U.S.-Chinese conflict and to clearly side 
with the United States will grow rather than diminish” (Peter 
Rudolf, “Der amerikanisch-chinesische Weltkonflikt”, in 
Barbara Lippert and Volker Perthes, eds., Strategische Rivalität 
zwischen USA und China, SWP-Studie 1/2020 [Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2020], 12, https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/ 
2020S01_lpt_prt_WEB.pdf [accessed 26 February 2020]). 
23 “America started using the dollar system as a geopoliti-
cal weapon in earnest after the attacks of September 11th 
2001 [...] President Trump has taken this policy to a new 
level of intensity, using sanctions as his main foreign-policy 
tool and even targeting allies with ‘secondary’ sanctions that 
punish anyone who trades with states in America’s bad 
books.” (“Dethroning the Dollar. The Search to Find an Alter-
native to the Dollar”, The Economist, 18 January 2020, 12). 
24 Ibid., 13; similarly, a former director of the European 
central bank stated: “In such an environment, being the 
issuer of a global reserve currency confers international 
monetary power, in particular the capacity to ‘weaponise’ 
would have to expect Washington to be all the more 
inclined to use its remaining leverage in the defence 
area. 
Moreover, parity with the dollar might be unattain-
able without defence autonomy. According to a for-
mer director of the European Central Bank (ECB), for 
example, empirical evidence supports the view that 
the U.S. dollar benefits from a substantial security 
premium. Nations that depend on the U.S. security 
umbrella hold a disproportionate share of their for-
eign reserves in dollars.25 
Russia – a worrying neighbour 
The well-being and security of Russia and that of the 
European Union are linked in many ways. In addition 
to their geographical proximity, they have established 
mutually beneficial economic ties, particularly in the 
oil and gas sector. 
Russia is a medium-sized power in economic and 
technological terms, but it remains a major military 
power with a formidable nuclear arsenal. This does 
not pose a threat in and of itself, because military 
capabilities only become a source of concern when 
political actors distrust each other. 
Following the demise of the Cold War, a stable 
relationship of trust between Russia, on the one hand 
and its European neighbours and North America, on 
the other has not materialised. At their London sum-
mit in December 2019, NATO member states declared 
that “Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to 
Euro-Atlantic security”.26 Russia under President Putin 
has provided plenty of reasons to be wary: annexation 
of the Crimea peninsula and intervention in Ukraine; 
cyberattacks and attempts to influence election out-
 
access to the financial and payments systems.” (European 
Central Bank, “The Euro’s Global Role in a Changing World: 
A Monetary Policy Perspective. Speech by Benoît Cœuré” 
[New York, 15 February 2019], https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ 
press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190215~15c89d887b.en.html 
[accessed 26 February 2020]). 
25 Benoît Cœuré, ibid.; Claeys and Wolff also count “sig-
nificant geopolitical and/or military power” among the 
criteria that historically, countries with “dominant curren-
cies” have to fulfil (Grégory Claeys and Guntram B. Wolff, 
Is the COVID-19 Crisis an Opportunity to Boost the Euro as a Global 
Currency, Policy Contribution 11/2020 [Brussels: Bruegel, June 
2020], 4, https://www.bruegel.org/2020/06/is-the-covid-19-
crisis-an-opportunity-to-boost-the-euro-as-a-global-currency/). 
26 London Declaration (see note 17). 
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comes; breach of the INF treaty on medium-range 
land-based missiles; military provocations against 
NATO and non-NATO states; massive military support 
for Syria’s Assad regime. Russian external aggressive-
ness goes hand in hand with internal repression, 
media control, and human rights violations. 
We are not seeing a return to the Cold War, and 
Moscow may not be solely responsible for failing to 
replace this conflict with a cooperative relationship 
with the European Union and the United States. 
Yet Russia has become an aggressive neighbour who 
arouses suspicion and demands countervailing 
hedging. 
World disorder 
The widespread view that the world is in turmoil 
should not give rise to a misplaced nostalgia for the 
Cold War: East-West enmity could have escalated into 
a nuclear war,27 and wars such as those in Korea and 
Vietnam form part of the Cold War legacy. 
Yet expectations that the East-West antagonism 
might be replaced by a cooperative world order have 
not materialised. Democracy and the rule of law have 
become fragile even in their Western strongholds; 
the transatlantic partnership is crumbling; China as 
an emerging world power is challenging the U.S. and 
Europe; Russia represents more of a threat; wars and 
crises outside Europe feed terrorism and increase the 
migratory pressure on Europe, which, in turn, nur-
ture right-wing populism and authoritarian move-
ments; arms control regimes are eroding; perennial 
conflicts in Europe’s neighbourhood, such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian or Iranian-Arab struggle remain un-
resolved; runaway climate change could trigger and 
intensify power and distributional struggles. Global 
trade and investment, cross-border supply chains, pan-
demics and migratory flows, the Internet and other 
easily accessible means of communication – all these 
and other phenomena of globalisation have brought 
the Earth’s inhabitants closer together than ever 
before, but there is a dearth of robust and widely 
accepted institutions and regimes to defuse the con-
flict-prone effects of global interdependence. 
 
27 It is one the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence that the 
possibility of an irreversible escalation into mutual annihila-
tion can exert a restraining and thus de-escalatory effect on 
the intensity of pre- and intra-war conflicts. 
Macron’s offer 
European self-defence is impossible without France. 
The country is an economic and political heavyweight 
in Europe as well as Germany’s closest partner; more 
importantly, in the present context France is the only 
EU Member State that possesses nuclear weapons. 
Over the years, various French presidents have noted 
that the mission of the Force de frappe, France’s nu-
clear arsenal, is not only to protect the French home-
land but to bolster the security of its allies, too.28 
However, this has never been put to the test because 
U.S. nuclear protection was considered irreplaceable. 
In February 2020, President Macron declared in a 
keynote speech on security policy that France’s vital 
interests “now have a European dimension” (my 
emphasis) and that “in this spirit” he was seeking a 
strategic dialogue on the role of France’s nuclear 
deterrent for common security with those European 
partners willing to take him up on this offer. Such 
partners could be associated with the exercises of 
French deterrence forces.29 
In so doing, Macron goes further than any presi-
dent before him. While Macron insists that Europe’s 
long-term security requires a strong alliance with the 
U.S., he also stresses that Washington is rightly send-
ing a strong and direct message to its European allies: 
“Spend more on your own security, I may not be your 
protector forever.”30 Macron’s offer is in line with his 
decidedly pro-European approach and his commit-
 
28 For a “quick history of the nuclear policy speeches of 
French presidents”, see Shahin Vallée, France and Germany 
Need a Dialogue on Nuclear Policy, DGAP Commentary (Berlin: 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik [DGAP], March 
2020), 3, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/france-and-
germany-need-dialogue-nuclear-policy (accessed 8 June 2020). 
29 “Let’s be clear: France’s vital interests now have a Euro-
pean dimension. In this spirit, I would like strategic dialogue 
to develop with our European partners, which are ready for 
it, on the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in our 
collective security. European partners which are willing to 
walk that road can be associated with the exercises of French 
deterrence forces” (“Speech of the President of the Republic 
on the Defence and Deterrence Strategy”, Paris, 7 February 
2020, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/ 
speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-
deterrence-strategy.en [accessed 7 June 2020]). 
30 “Let’s face it, and listen to the United States of America, 
telling us: ‘Spend more on your own security, I may no longer be, 
over time, your guarantor of last resort, your protector’” (ibid. – 
my emphasis). 
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ment to European sovereignty, particularly in the eco-
nomic, digital, and health sectors.31 
How far would the French president be prepared 
to go in Europeanising the deterrent perimeter of the 
Force de frappe? To find out, his invitation to dia-
logue would have to be taken up.32 But this would 
not be the first step. Crucially, the credibility of a 
French nuclear commitment to its EU neighbours 
would hinge on its political dependability, i.e., there 
must be no doubts about the offer being retracted 
following a change in government in France. This, in 
turn, needs a solid mutual trust between France and 
its partners that is rooted in close European and 
above all Franco-German integration. 
In their totality, these six trends and developments 
suggest four policy conclusions. First, Germany and 
Europe face clear and increased threats to their well-
being and security. Second, defusing these threats or 
keeping them in check will require military capabili-
ties, too. Third, regardless of who holds the post of U.S. 
president, militarily, Europe will have to fend for itself 
more. Finally, President Macron seems ready to discuss 
the possibility of a French nuclear umbrella for Europe. 
The pandemic as a damper? 
European self-defence is not on the European agenda. 
Instead, the focus is on less ambitious projects such 
as a European Defence Fund and PESCO (Permanent 
Structured Cooperation), “a framework and process to 
deepen defence cooperation between those EU Mem-
ber States who are capable and willing to do so.”33 
 
31 See French-German Initiative for European Recovery from the 
Coronavirus Crisis, Berlin, 18 May 2020, https://www.bundes 
kanzlerin.de/resource/blob/656734/1753772/414a4b5a1ca91d
4f7146eeb2b39ee72b/2020-05-18-deutsch-franzoesischer-
erklaerung-eng-data.pdf (accessed 4 November 2020). 
32 Demesmay and Kunz claim that “French nuclear 
policy is unsuitable for cooperation, to say the least.” (Claire 
Demesmay and Barbara Kunz, “Macron’s Foreign Policy”, 
Internationale Politik 75, no. 2 [2020]: 90). However, the ques-
tion is not whether this is the case today, but whether its 
European partners should therefore refrain from putting 
France to the test. Even the critics quoted would probably 
not want that. 
33 See “About PESCO”, https://pesco.europa.eu/ (accessed 
7 November 2020). “25 EU Member States have joined PESCO 
and subscribed to more binding commitments to invest, 
plan, develop and operate defence capabilities more together, 
within the Union framework.” (ibid.). 
It is likely that the fallout of the corona pandemic 
will adversely affect PESCO projects as well as national 
defence budgets. EU Member States may be hit by the 
severest economic slump in EU history as they face 
soaring debt levels in the wake of unprecedented aid 
and recovery programmes. Furthermore, containing 
the pandemic and its devastating consequences will 
absorb a great deal of political energy and attention 
at both EU and national levels. 
At first glance, these seem like unpropitious condi-
tions for strengthening European defence capabilities, 
let alone for launching a highly ambitious project such 
as European defence autonomy. However, the struc-
tural incentive as well as critical recent developments 
are valid reasons for putting the subject of European 
self-defence back on the political table, and the pan-
demic could increase the pressure on Europe to focus 
more on looking after itself. As the United States has 
been hit hard by coronavirus, whoever is the next presi-
dent will expect more self-reliance from America’s 
European partners.34 China’s high-handedness and 
claim to world power status have been unaffected by 
the outbreak of the pandemic in the country. The 
crisis has fuelled rather than attenuated Sino-American 
rivalry, and the devastation wrought by the pandemic 
could exacerbate conflicts and put further strain on 
fragile states and economies in the vicinity of Europe.35 
In addition to such external threats and challenges, 
there are two factors relating to internal European 
politics that point in the same direction. First, Euro-
 
34 “In the longer term, however – over the span of two 
or three presidencies – the corona pandemic could further 
weaken the social foundations of America’s global security 
policy; at least if socio-economic inequalities in the U.S. can-
not be reduced. Germany and other U.S. partners must brace 
themselves for more frequent and intense disputes over se-
curity policy and military burden-sharing in NATO.” (Marco 
Overhaus, Das Virus und die Weltmacht. Mögliche Folgen der Coro-
na-Pandemie für die US-amerikanische Sicherheits- und Verteidi-
gungspolitik, SWP-Aktuell 44/2020 [Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, June 2020], 8, http://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2020A44_corona_usa.pdf 
[accessed 15 July 2020 – my translation]). 
35 “Nor should we forget that none of the other problems 
that prevailed before the Corona crisis have disappeared. They 
could even get worse” (Josep Borrell, “The Coronavirus pan-
demic and the new world it has created”, European External 
Action Service [online], 23 March 2020, https://eeas.europa. 
eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/76437/node/76437_ 
en [accessed 31 March 2020]; see also Nina von Hardenberg, 
“Jenseits der Pandemie: Was vor Corona wichtig war – und 
es heute noch ist”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 April 2020, 6–7.) 
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pean military capabilities suffer from duplication and 
inefficiency due to uncoordinated national procure-
ment and planning processes.36 Pandemic-induced 
pressures on defence budgets could thus lead to the 
more affordable development of common capabili-
ties, coordinated procurement, and a Europe-wide 
armaments market. 
The second propitious factor is also linked to the 
pandemic and the policy lessons drawn from it. EU 
Heads of State and Government have called on Mem-
ber States “to take all necessary measures to protect 
strategic assets and technology from foreign invest-
ments that could threaten legitimate public policy 
objectives. This will contribute to the EU’s strategic 
autonomy, during the crisis and afterwards.”37 
Increased self-sufficiency on defence production and 
technology would contribute to this goal, as well. 
Moreover, the corona crisis is a powerful reminder 
of how invaluable a united Europe is. Although 
national reflexes prevailed at the start, Member States 
quickly realised that a collective European response 
was required to cope with the crisis. 
The pandemic has laid bare the fragility of supply 
chains and the potentially harmful effects of exces-
sive dependency. The lesson for Europe is that it must 
become autonomous through controlled deglobalisa-
tion, not only with regard to medicine and protective 
clothing, but also to protect its digital and energy 
infrastructure and to improve its technological com-
petitiveness. Boosting Europe’s autonomy in these 
areas is a longer-term project that Member States still 
have to underwrite with the requisite decisions and 
financial resources. In contrast, the pandemic recov-
ery funds adopted by Member States significantly ad-
vance European integration: because of its size alone: 
€750 billion with a high proportion of non-repayable 
grants (€390 billion) but, even more importantly, 
because the funds are to be financed by common 
European borrowing that will be serviced by the EU 
budget. Up till now, such debt mutualisation had 
been anathema to Member States such as Germany.38 
 
36 See European Commission, Towards a European Defence 
Union. Towards a More United, Stronger and More Democratic 
Union (May 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/euco-sibiu-towards_a_european_defence_ 
union_0.pdf (accessed 8 June 2020). 
37 Joint Statement of the Members of the European Council (Brussels, 
26 March 2020), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ 
43076/26-vc-euco-statement-en.pdf (accessed 7 November 2020). 
38 See Eckhard Lübkemeier and Nicolai von Ondarza, 
A Corona Presidency in the Coronavirus Crisis? The Dual Task of the 
Despite this progress, European self-defence would 
still represent a quantum leap in European integration. 
Yet as Europe becomes more empowered in areas 
other than defence, driven by strategic autonomy as its 
leitmotif, the Achilles heel of this autonomy, namely 
Europe’s asymmetrical dependence on the U.S. in the 
field of defence, will stand out in striking contrast. 
Thus, in addition to the structural motive reinforced 
by recent political developments, the corona pandemic 
provides an additional impetus to revisit the feasibil-
ity and desirability of European self-defence. Effective 
conflict prevention and crisis management will con-
tinue to also require military means, while the U.S. 
will be less willing to provide Europe with military 
support at acceptable costs and risks.39 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has stated: 
“And it is no longer the case that the United States 
will simply protect us; Europe must take its fate into 
its own hands.”40 Can and should Europe go as far 
as taking its fate into its own hands when it comes to 
defence autonomy, too? 
 
German Presidency: Containing the Crisis and Giving a Lasting 
Impetus to European Solidarity and Autonomy, SWP Comment 
33/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 
2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C33/ 
(accessed 8 November 2020). 
39 The latter corresponds with the view of a large part of 
the German population: In September 2019, just under half 
of those interviewed (52 percent) were in favour of greater 
independence from the U.S., 63 percent rated relations be-
tween Germany and the U.S. as rather poor, and only 22 per-
cent wanted to continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
(see Körber Stiftung, Einmischen oder zurückhalten? Eine repräsen-
tative Umfrage im Auftrag der Körber-Stiftung zur Sicht der Deut-
schen auf die Außenpolitik (Hamburg, 2019), https://bit.ly/34AWzZu 
(accessed 28 February 2020 – my translation). 
40 “Speech by Federal Chancellor Merkel in Aachen on 
10 May 2018”, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/ 
aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel-
anlaesslich-der-verleihung-des-karlspreises-am-10-mai-in-
aachen-1008452 (accessed 26 February 2020 – my trans-
lation); see also Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Markus Söder, 
and Manfred Weber, “Wir stehen gegen die Feinde Europas 
auf”, FAZ, 15 February 2019, 8: “Our Europe is successful and 
powerful. We want to take our fate into our own hands.” 
(my translation). Similarly, German Foreign Minister Maas 
has noted: “Yes, Europe must be able to defend itself in 
future. Nonetheless, our cooperation within NATO remains 
important.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 February 2020, 14 
(my translation). 
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Deciding whether or not to pursue the objective of 
European defence autonomy poses three main ques-
tions: What are the requirements (“what must be 
done”)? Would Europe be able to meet those require-
ments (“what could be done”)? And, even if it could, 
would defence autonomy be a desirable goal given 
the inevitable costs and risks (“what should be done”)? 
If the decision is made to pursue defence autonomy, 
the next step would be to devise a political strategy to 
achieve the objective. Such a strategy would centre 
on three issues: What conditions are needed to ensure 
the success of the project? Which Member States 
might be willing to support the project? What are the 
potential risks and how could these be minimised? 
Seeking to answer these questions would presuppose 
that defence autonomy is deemed desirable in the 
first place. They are, therefore, not addressed in the 
present chapter, but in the final one which makes 
the case for European self-defence. 
What must be done? 
Just as in politics itself, reflecting on politics has to 
start with a long, hard look at reality. Viewed though 
this prism, the status quo is sobering: “Currently, 
Europe cannot provide for its own defence. We have 
to rely on the transatlantic alliance.”41 And, according 
to Chancellor Merkel, this will continue to be the case 
for the foreseeable future.42 
 
41 Speech by Chancellor Merkel, 27 November 2020, 
https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/rede-von-
bundeskanzlerin-merkel-im-deutschen-bundestag-1699682 
(accessed on 28 February 2020 – my translation). 
42 Interview with Financial Times, “Europe Is no Longer at 
the Centre of World Events”, 9 January 2020, http://www.ft. 
com/content/00f9135c-3840-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 (accessed 
on 24 August 2020); see also Claudia Major, Die Rolle der NATO 
für Europas Verteidigung. Stand und Optionen zur Weiterentwick-
lung aus deutscher Perspektive, SWP-Studie 25/2019 (Berlin: Stif-
The four prerequisites for self-
defence: Foundation, capabilities, 
strategy, and leadership. 
Against this backdrop, what would it take to 
enable Europe to stand on its own feet in this regard? 
There are four essential requirements: a solid foun-
dation, sufficient capabilities, a suitable strategy, and 
political leadership. 
Foundation 
A thought experiment may help illustrate the critical 
importance of this requirement. The U.S. forms the 
backbone of NATO. Could Europe defend itself if there 
were a similarly powerful European state? The answer 
is: not necessarily, because on their own even the 
most formidable military capabilities would not suf-
fice. A potential adversary as well as the members of 
a defence alliance must be confident that, if need be, 
the political will to use military means will be forth-
coming. Crucially, this must be done in such a way 
that an attacker would run an unacceptable risk, 
whereas for the supplier and recipient of a defence 
commitment, the risk must be bearable if and when 
the pledge is honoured. 
This would be the case if Europe were a federal 
state with sub-state political entities sharing a com-
mon identity and an unwavering sense of solidarity. 
But the “United States of Europe” is nowhere in sight; 
for quite some time to come, Europe will remain a 
union of nation-states. 
 
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2019), 6: “Without 
the conventional and nuclear contributions of the U.S., a 
credible deterrence for and military defence of Europe can-
not be guaranteed for the time being”, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2019S25_mjr_ 
Web.pdf (accessed 6 July 2020 – my translation). 
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Conceptualizing a Europe able to defend itself 
must start with this reality. This does not render it 
elusive, however. The EU is a political entity with no 
historical analogy: a hybrid of inter- and supranational 
elements in which nation-states have transferred a 
substantial part of their sovereignty to the European 
level.43 This “de-nationalisation” in favour of collec-
tive sovereignty was made possible because EU mem-
bers share a common European identity. Since there 
is no European people, but only peoples of Europe, 
this sense of belonging (“Europeanness”) is weaker 
than national identities. Hence, European cohesion 
necessitates a second component: the national inter-
ests of EU Member States. From a nation-state point of 
view, Europe’s added value lies in its collective power: 
together, EU members can more effectively and effi-
ciently pursue their core national interests of peace 
and security, prosperity, and self-assertion in the 
international arena. 
Nevertheless, the combined strength of European 
identity and national interests has so far been insuffi-
cient to generate the will and the capabilities needed 
for European self-defence. On the one hand, the costs 
and risks of American protection have been deemed 
lower than those of defence autonomy. On the other 
hand, one essential resource has been lacking: Mem-
ber States’ confidence in their mutual reliability. The 
demands placed on this resource are much higher 
in the field of defence than in the case of a common 
currency. Chancellor Merkel’s warning, “If the euro 
fails, Europe fails”, emphasises what is at stake in this 
area. Yet there would be much more at stake if Euro-
pean self-defence were to fail: If Member States were 
to renege on their mutual assistance pledge when 
challenged by an attacker, the survival of those being 
attacked would be in jeopardy. 
The reference to monetary union is also revealing 
in another way. Given what is at stake, greater con-
vergence than in the case of the single currency 
would be needed. Despite insufficient alignment of 
national economies and “economic cultures”, the 
euro was launched in the hope that the functional 
necessities of a currency union would force a catch-
up convergence. But this did not happen. The same 
 
43 This is illustrated by, among others, the single market, 
a common currency, the Schengen area, supranational insti-
tutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament, 
and the European Court of Justice, as well as qualified 
majority voting. 
mistake must not be repeated when embarking on 
a European self-defence union. 
Therefore, a prior alignment of strategic cultures 
is essential. It would be part and parcel of a process 
of confidence-building among Member States, which 
would lead to and subsequently preserve European 
defence autonomy. After all, in a union of nation-
states the readiness of a country to entrust its survival 
in the solidarity of others is never a given but must be 
constantly renewed. In this way, defence autonomy 
is linked to overall European integration: whenever a 
united Europe provides its Member States and citizens 
with tangible added value, European identity and 
solidarity, and thus the underpinnings of European 
self-defence, is strengthened. 
Capabilities 
European self-defence requires robust conventional 
and nuclear capabilities as well as a domestic arms 
industry.44 
Yet adequate conventional capabilities would not 
necessitate a single European army. Doubtless, this is 
something that would be highly desirable: politically, 
it would signal and foster unwavering solidarity, mili-
tarily, it would mean optimum effectiveness and effi-
ciency. Unfortunately, under the prevailing circum-
stances of an EU composed of nation-states, a uniform 
military organisation is a long-term prospect at best. 
In the meantime, multilateral units and common 
capabilities could increasingly complement national 
units, thus becoming the growing nucleus of a single 
European army. However, the military interoperabil-
ity of national and European capabilities would be 
indispensable, and politically there must be no doubt 
that these would be available for the unconditional 
protection of all. 
In addition, Europe would need a substantial and 
sophisticated armaments industry. As is the case with 
civilian technologies and products, an asymmetrical 
dependence on third-party suppliers would severely 
constrain Europe’s strategic autonomy. 
Last but not least, Europe would have to tackle the 
most delicate and demanding of military requirements: 
“Nuclear deterrence remains the litmus test that 
determines whether Europe can play an independent 
 
44 In order to underscore the fundamentally different 
nature of nuclear weapons, the term conventional also 
includes more novel instruments such as cyber capabilities 
and non-nuclear hypersonic weapons. 
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role in security policy.”45 When potential adversaries 
are or could become nuclear armed, defence without 
nuclear deterrence is impossible: “To demand their 
abolition is noble yet hopeless. The knowledge of how 
to build nuclear weapons cannot be buried in oblivion, 
and no nuclear power will expose itself to the danger 
of being blackmailed by a country that was previously 
a nuclear “nobody” or an irresponsible actor.”46 Nu-
clear weapons cannot be uninvented, they can only 
be defused politically in peace communities such 
as the EU where war has become inconceivable. A 
world-wide peace community, however, is a utopian 
ideal but not a realistic prospect. Therefore, European 
self-defence would require both conventional and 
nuclear forces. 
The size and composition of these forces is not a 
given. A major determinant is an analysis of present 
and future threats. Yet this alone does not provide an 
answer to the key question “How much is enough 
for what?”. This leads us to the third requirement for 
European self-defence. 
Strategy 
The purpose of a strategy is to ensure that the re-
sources needed to achieve a goal are used effectively 
and efficiently. What type and level of military 
capabilities Europe would have to possess in order 
to defend itself cannot be derived solely from an 
“objective” threat analysis. Military capabilities only 
pose a threat when they are in the hands of an actor 
deemed untrustworthy – a thoroughly political 
judgement. 
For this reason alone, the military capabilities 
needed for European self-defence are not preordained. 
Moreover, a threat assessment is an on-going exercise 
that must take into account an evolving international 
environment. Influencing this environment in order 
to contain and reduce its potential for violence is 
the task of a foreign and security policy employing a 
 
45 Eric Gujer, “Macron ist Machtpolitiker, und die Deut-
schen sind Romantiker”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), 16 Feb-
ruary 2020, https://www.nzz.ch/international/macron-ist-
machtpolitiker-und-die-deutschen-sind-romantiker-ld. 
1540830 (accessed 30 June 2020). The French White Paper of 
1994 states concisely: “Nuclear capabilities render European 
defence autonomy possible. Without them it is impossible” 
(Livre Blanc sur la Défense [Paris, June 1994], 56, http://www. 
livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-
defense-1994.pdf [accessed 30 June 2020 – my translation]). 
46 Bahr, Deutsche Interessen (see note 3), 53. 
broad range of approaches and instruments, includ-
ing arms control and disarmament arrangements. 
And a military posture should, as much as possible, 
reflect professed defensive intentions because by their 
very existence, armed forces signal explicit or linger-
ing distrust. 
Therefore, the threat or use of military means 
carries an inherent risk of intensifying a conflict. To 
control and attenuate this risk, an overarching politi-
cal strategy must give priority to civilian conflict pre-
vention and crisis management as well as establishing 
cooperative and rules-based regimes and institutions. 
However, to be a fail-safe solution in an environment 
of obvious or latent hostilities, it needs a military 
backstop. 
Leadership 
As with the euro, it will take bold leadership to achieve 
European self-defence. Germany and France may not 
be sufficient in this regard but they are nevertheless in-
dispensable due to their political, economic, and mili-
tary weight and because France is the only nuclear-
armed EU Member State since the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal. 
The euro analogy is relevant in other respects, too. 
While plans for a monetary union had been devised 
even before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989, the end of the division of Germany and Europe 
acted as a catalyst for the introduction of the com-
mon currency. 
So far, the epochal shifts and cataclysmic events of 
the first two decades of the 21st century have failed 
to provide a similar impetus to European self-defence. 
As noted earlier, this is because more is at stake in the 
defence field and because monetary union is an un-
appealing model given the lack of convergence, the 
euro crisis that erupted in 2010, and the still incom-
plete stabilisation through a fully-fledged banking 
and capital market union. 
Yet another major reason is the lack of political 
leadership. In a European Union of democratic 
nation-states, it is the Member States that must take 
the initiative, especially when it comes to European 
self-defence. They will certainly not leave it to a 
supranational EU body to decide on the use of force 
and thus the fate of their citizens and voters instead. 
In democratic systems, political leadership needs a 
mandate from the electorate. Yet political leadership 
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is not only about executing the will of the people.47 
Leadership must also be asserted when this will is 
unclear, inconsistent, or contradictory, and above all 
in situations in which the support among the elec-
torate for what political leaders consider to be in the 
national interest is brittle. 
This is especially true for Germany. Trust in the 
U.S. has declined sharply among Germans, and at 
the end of 2019 three quarters of them agreed with 
Chancellor Merkel’s statement that Europeans must 
take their fate into their own hands. Yet only 20 per-
cent agreed that Germany would have to make a 
greater military effort to this end, whereas 60 percent 
disagreed with this statement.48 
In addition, the German armed forces are beset 
by major deficiencies. The 2019 annual report of the 
Federal Commissioner for the Armed Forces shows 
that the Bundeswehr’s operational readiness is 
severely limited: “Staff shortages, material shortages, 
and excessive bureaucracy remain a feature of every-
day life in many places.”49 According to current budg-
etary projections, Germany intends to reach NATO’s 
defence spending target of at least two percent of GDP 
by 2031, i.e., seven years later than the agreed 2024. 
President Macron’s offer to conduct a dialogue on the 
role of French nuclear weapons for European defence 
has not yet been taken up by the German govern-
ment. 
In line with Clausewitz’ most famous dictum, a 
political strategy (he termed it “the guiding intelli-
gence”) determines the use or non-use of military 
means. Yet under the present and foreseeable cir-
cumstances, such means are necessary to safeguard 
peace and security, and European self-defence re-
quires a greater German willingness to take on more 
military responsibility. It is up to Germany’s political 
 
47 Speaking from rich experience, former Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt candidly admitted: “That is one of the 
disadvantages of democracy: political success depends on 
getting the people to support you, which creates a huge 
temptation to tell them what they want to hear.” (Helmut 
Schmidt and Fritz Stern, Unser Jahrhundert. Ein Gespräch 
[Munich, 2010], 190 – my translation). 
48 See Thomas Petersen, “Halbherzige Verteidigungsbereit-
schaft”, FAZ, 19 December 2019, 8. 
49 See German Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Unterrichtung 
durch den Wehrbeauftragten. Jahresbericht 2019 (Berlin, 28 Janu-
ary 2020), quoted on p. 5, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/ 
btd/19/165/1916500.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020 – my trans-
lation). 
leaders to make this case to the German public and 
to act accordingly.50 
What could be done? 
As this section will demonstrate, Europe could pro-
vide for its own defence if it wanted to. In this respect, 
the two essential enablers are shared identity and 
interests (“foundation”) as well as leadership by a 
“critical mass” of participating states, in particular 
Germany and France. The pivotal role of these two 
countries is to generate and sustain the requisite 
political will. 
Meeting the other two requirements (“capabili-
ties” and “strategy”) would still be an ambitious and 
demanding, but not impossible task. 
Strategy 
In the founding act, participating states would have 
to agree, inter alia, on the rationale and basic goals of 
a European self-defence union, the commitments and 
contributions Member States would have to make for 
it to work, the institutional setup of the union, as well 
as the kind and size of capabilities needed for self-
defence and their coordinated development. In addi-
tion, they would lay out the core principles guiding 
the project: NATO and the transatlantic partnership 
remain central to Europe’s security; the union’s door 
is open to those who initially chose not to join; the 
capabilities and operational options developed are to 
bolster the wider EU’s ability to act; armed forces are 
indispensable but they are just one instrument for 
conflict prevention and crisis management; whenever 
 
50 “I can understand why our partners legitimately get the 
impression that Germany is not stepping up to the plate [...] 
Following the disaster of 1945 we have internalised a culture 
of restraint [...] Showing off does not suit us. But our history 
cannot be a fig leaf. It must not be used as an excuse for 
shirking responsibility [...] While long-standing issues of 
European stability must be kept in mind, the time has come 
to define strategic interests, to explain again and again the 
context of foreign policy and to convince the Germans of the 
necessity of taking additional steps in the field of defence 
policy. Even in the face of resistance. In other words: politi-
cal leadership is needed.” (Adenauer Lecture 2019 of Bundes-
tagspräsident Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble “Deutschlands Rolle 
in der globalisierten Welt”, 29 October 2019, http://www. 
bundestag.de/parlament/praesidium/reden/2019/043-665622 
[accessed on 4 March 2020 – my translation]). 
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and wherever possible civilian means are the pre-
ferred instruments of a political strategy aimed at 
promoting a cooperative and rules-based international 
order. 
Such a strategy document would have to be re-
viewed and adapted in line with an evolving regional 
and global environment and it would need to be in-
spired by strong leadership. Such leadership will only 
be forthcoming if Europe is able to underpin a self-
defence union with sufficient military capabilities. 
This requirement will be analysed next, first for con-
ventional and then nuclear defence. 
Conventional self-defence 
When discussing the issue of whether Europe can 
afford robust conventional forces, two potential 
pitfalls present themselves: underestimating the costs 
or regarding them as prohibitive. A study conducted 
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) serves as an illustration.51 
The starting point of the IISS analysis is an 
“Amerexit”: the U.S. withdrawing from NATO and 
refusing to come to the aid of its former allies. The 
analysis then employs two scenarios (the protection 
of sea lines of communication and the response to 
limited Russian aggression against Lithuania and 
parts of Poland) to calculate what it would cost to 
close the capability gaps left by the U.S.. In the first 
scenario, the price tag would be between US$94 and 
US$110 billion, for the second scenario this would 
rise to between US$288 and US$357 billion. The Insti-
tute maintains that it would take Europe up to 20 
years to procure the military equipment needed to 
compensate for an “Amerexit”.52 
The IISS analysis provides an initial estimate of the 
prospective costs of conventional self-defence, in par-
ticular since the IISS scenarios are not based on worst-
case assumptions, such as an even larger Russian 
attack and/or several simultaneous operations. Yet 
despite the hefty price tag, the Institute warns against 
concluding that European efforts are hopeless and 
 
51 See Ben Barry et al., Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capa-
bility Requirements for NATO’s European Members (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], April 2019), 
http://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/defending-
europe (accessed 4 March 2020). 
52 Ibid., 3. 
that Europe is structurally incapable of defending 
itself.53 
And this is with good reason: affluent Europe has 
the financial and technological resources needed to 
support collective self-defence. Hence, any attempt 
to convince the American Congress of the opposite 
when the U.S. spends a much greater percentage of 
its GDP on defence than Europe would be a fruitless 
endeavour. Moreover, it would be tantamount to ad-
mitting that Europe was permanently trapped in a 
state of existential dependency on an external power. 
Such vulnerability entails three interrelated risks: first, 
Europe would struggle to hold its own in the event 
of a major conflict of interests with its American ally; 
this would also restrict Europe’s freedom of action vis-
à-vis third parties; and if these actors believed that the 
U.S. defence commitment was wavering they might 
be tempted to adopt a more confrontational stance in 
dealing with Europe. 
Conventional self-defence 
is affordable. 
Moreover, there is no clear-cut criterion to deter-
mine what Europe would need to defend itself. It 
could be argued that the military capabilities of 
potential adversaries should be the benchmark. Yet 
there is no “objective” way to accurately determine 
the threat they pose because how weapon systems 
and their interplay would perform in wartime and 
whether an aggressor would be able to tactically and 
strategically maximise their effectiveness all come 
down to a judgment call. The same is true for assess-
ing the intentions and objectives of an opponent, 
their willingness to incur risks and escalate the level 
of violence. 
Moreover, it would take a political decision to mark 
the perimeter of European self-defence. Europe needs 
robust non-nuclear capabilities for two main purposes: 
defence and intervention. In the context of defence, 
their mission is to deter and repel attacks. Effective 
conventional defence raises the attacker’s risk and 
thus lowers the defender’s risk of having to choose 
between a rock and a hard place, i.e., between sur-
render or nuclear escalation. 
Intervention scenarios do not involve, at least not 
initially, attacks on a country’s own territory. Never-
 
53 Ibid., 42: “The point of this work is not to say that Euro-
pean efforts are hopeless and European governments struc-
turally unable to defend themselves.” 
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theless, a military intervention is rarely a purely 
altruistic undertaking. This is obvious given that its 
objective is to protect its own citizens in third-party 
conflicts or in counterterrorism operations, such 
as the one launched to quash the so-called “Islamic 
State”. The aim of this operation was twofold: to pro-
tect the victims of IS rule on IS-controlled territory 
and to thwart IS-organised or IS-inspired terrorism in 
the member states of the anti-IS coalition. Military 
operations that help to create a secure environment 
for economic and social development reduce the 
incentives to migrate to Europe. And the protection 
of maritime transport routes serves the economic 
interests of participating countries. 
This incomplete list of conventional defence and 
intervention scenarios suggests two conclusions: fail-
safe protection against every conceivable risk is im-
possible and using finite resources comes with oppor-
tunity costs. Yet military overinsurance would not 
only entail a waste of resources, it could also lead to 
an over-reliance on military instruments at the ex-
pense of civilian means. 
In point of fact, however, Europe’s predicament is 
the opposite: it suffers from military underinsurance 
due to segregated armed forces, defence spending, 
and armaments markets. Thus, to a large extent, the 
capability gaps identified in the IISS study are related 
to insufficient integration and coordination among 
EU Member States. If they could muster the political 
will to progressively “de-nationalise” their military 
establishments in favour of common capabilities, 
each euro spent on defence would generate a con-
siderably higher return on investment in Europe’s 
ability to defend itself.54 
The crux of the matter is the subjective nature 
of answering the “How-much-is-enough-for-what?” 
question. The primacy of policy implies that a vig-
orous effort must be made to curtail the size and type 
of military capabilities through bilateral and multi-
lateral disarmament and arms control. But one can-
not replace the other. Stable peace without military 
reinsurance requires rock-solid confidence in the recip-
 
54 “Our research shows that joint European procurement 
can provide 30 percent savings on equipment investment. In 
addition, joint procurement would facilitate interoperability, 
joint maintenance, and joint training.” (Munich Security Con-
ference, More European, More Connected and More Capable. Build-
ing the European Armed Forces of the Future (Munich, 2017), 7, 
https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_ 
Publikationen/MSCEuropeanDefenceReport2017.pdf [accessed 
4 March 2020]). 
rocal willingness to settle conflicts without resorting 
to violence. The EU is the very incarnation of a peace 
community in which war has become inconceivable. 
Yet a global peace community is not on the cards. 
In light of this, disarmament and arms control are all 
the more necessary but they are no substitute for a 
military backstop. 
Nuclear self-defence 
Thus, deciding on the quantity and quality of the 
conventional forces needed for European self-defence 
is an inherently political task. This applies a fortiori 
to its nuclear dimension. There can be no European 
defence autonomy without a nuclear deterrent, but 
deploying one is far more difficult than ensuring con-
ventional self-reliance. 
This is due to the peculiar nature of both the EU 
and nuclear weapons. The EU is not a federal state, 
and we can realistically assume that, for the foresee-
able future, it will remain a partially supranational 
union of nation-states. For their part, rather than rep-
resenting an evolution of war-fighting technology, 
nuclear weapons mark a revolutionary turning point 
in the history of war and violence. Its essence was 
described at the dawn of the nuclear age as follows: 
“Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establish-
ments has been to win wars. From now on its chief 
purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost 
no other useful purpose.”55 More than seven decades 
later, this observation is still valid for situations in 
which adversaries face mutually assured destruction 
because each possesses an assured second-strike capa-
bility. In such circumstances, the imperative is to pre-
vent conflicts from spiralling into potentially uncon-
trollable hostilities. 
Given this existential risk, nuclear retaliatory threats 
are only unconditional when an actor employs them 
to protect their own existence: when an actor has 
nothing left to lose but their survival, an attacker 
faces a devastating response. This primary or homeland 
deterrence is unavailable to an EU of nation-states. It 
would only be available if Europe’s citizens saw them-
selves as a body politic with a common identity com-
parable to that of a nation-state. Then, and only then, 
would a European authority, endowed with the requi-
site mandate and legitimacy by Europe’s citizens, 
 
55 Bernard Brodie, “The Implications for Military Policy”, 
in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Ber-
nard Brodie (New York, 1946), 76. 
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be in a position to decide on the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear self-defence must do 
without Britain. 
Given this limitation, is there an alternative to 
the nuclear protection provided by the U.S.? Since a 
nuclear deterrent by Europe is unattainable for the 
time being, there is just one option left: a deterrent 
for Europe by one or more European states. 
Today, there are only two European nuclear powers: 
France and the United Kingdom. Brexit has made it 
even less likely that a joint Franco-British nuclear um-
brella could protect Europe. A country that has opted 
to cast off the alleged shackles of European integra-
tion will neither want to nor actually be trustworthy 
enough to risk its own survival for the security of its 
erstwhile EU partners. 
But even if Britain were willing to incur such risk – 
for as long as it not part of EU integration, it could 
only offer what the U.S. has been providing for 
decades, namely extended deterrence. Yet the con-
straints, risks, and costs associated with this type of 
deterrence stand in the way of European self-defence. 
So, while a British contribution would still be desir-
able, it cannot be a sine qua non given Britain’s politi-
cal status of a non-EU nuclear power. 
Unless, of course, the country were to experience 
a Pearl Harbor moment, an abrupt shock triggering a 
political about-turn. The Japanese attack in 1941 
forced the U.S. government, and, perhaps even more 
importantly, a reluctant population, to acknowledge 
that going to war against Japan and Germany could 
no longer be avoided. A comparable volte-face of 
British security policy could only be expected if the 
U.S. withdrew from NATO and its bilateral security 
commitments to Britain – a “Black Swan”-type sce-
nario that, until the Trump presidency, had been 
relegated to the realm of the unthinkable.56 
Trump’s erratic and reckless behaviour serves as a 
reminder never to lose sight of the possible downsides 
of unilateral dependencies. However, taking the “Black 
 
56 See above, p. 8 (“Trump or no Trump – the old West 
is dead”. For an argument in favour of pulling out of NATO, 
see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ”The Case for 
Offshore Balancing. A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, Foreign 
Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016), 82: “In Europe, the United States 
should end its military presence and turn NATO over to the 
Europeans.” 
Swan”-scenario as a premise for empowering Europe 
to defend itself would be counterproductive. First, 
while it cannot be ruled out entirely, it is still seen 
as a highly unlikely scenario. Moreover, it could be 
argued that such a worst-case assumption could be-
come a self-fulfilling prophecy by triggering a fateful 
spiral of mistrust in transatlantic relations that would 
result in a U.S.-European split that no one wanted. 
As a catalyst for a process leading to European 
defence self-sufficiency, the “Black Swan” is neither 
useful nor necessary. But the scenario does demon-
strate that proponents of the project should not count 
on British involvement. 
The same applies to the proposition that Britain 
might be replaced by one or more new European 
nuclear powers. By all accounts, Germany would have 
to be one of them. Yet a “German bomb” would call 
into question the viability of NATO, the EU, and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.57 
So Europe is left with the French nuclear arsenal, 
which appears unsuitable for the task. France acquired 
nuclear weapons for reasons of national prestige and 
as an attribute of great power status in line with its 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. But there 
are two additional motives: a lack of trust in the reli-
ability of the U.S. nuclear commitment and a desire 
to enhance its national capacity to act. These motives 
are incompatible with what Europe needs: a power 
willing and able to provide nuclear cover for Euro-
pean self-defence. 
The question is whether France can become what 
it has so far not been and indeed was never meant 
to be: a replacement for the U.S. when it comes to 
nuclear protection for Europe. The counterargument 
that this is impossible simply because the French 
president will not share his nuclear decision-making 
monopoly with others does not hold. After all, this is 
something the American president would never do 
either – a fact that has not and does not turn U.S. 
nuclear protection into an empty promise. 
A more plausible objection is that, compared with 
the U.S. arsenal, the French stockpile of around 300 
warheads on a limited number of carrier systems is 
too small and vulnerable for the task. Evaluating this 
argument must start with the observation that con-
ventional and nuclear weapon systems are funda-
mentally different. 
 
57 See Wolfgang Ischinger, “Bloß kein atomares Deutsch-
land”, Die Welt, 30 July 2018, 2. 
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Unlike conventional weapons, 
nuclear weapons are unsuitable for 
military duels. 
While conventional weapons could also be used 
against civilian targets, their primary purpose is to 
destroy military capabilities. This “duel-type situa-
tion” means that an adversary’s conventional forces 
must be the main benchmark of a conventional deter-
rent and defence posture. Nuclear weapons could also 
be used to destroy military targets (“counterforce”). 
Yet due to their infinite destructiveness, and because 
crossing the nuclear threshold would be an escalatory 
step fundamentally changing the nature of a war, 
keeping a counterforce “duel” within tolerable dam-
age limits could be well-nigh impossible. Indeed, the 
spectre of an uncontrollable escalation into mutual 
annihilation is one, if not the main reason why nu-
clear weapons have so far never been used between 
nuclear-armed adversaries.58 Consequently, a nuclear 
deterrent need not mimic an adversary’s arsenal. 
Provided it meets two conditions. Deterrence is a 
product of capabilities and perception. Therefore, the 
first prerequisite of an effective nuclear deterrent is 
retaliatory capability: a nuclear arsenal must be sus-
tainable, i.e., it must be technically immune to a dis-
arming strike. The second requirement relates to an 
adversary’s perception: the adversary must assume 
that the nuclear-armed victim of their attack is in a 
position to make use of its retaliatory capability.59 
The key factor for determining the second-strike 
or retaliatory capacity of a nuclear force is an adver-
sary’s military arsenal.60 Yet just how threatening 
an opponent’s forces are is difficult to gauge because 
their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness, respectively) 
would only become apparent in the event of war. 
Nevertheless, it is easier for an actor to assess the capa-
 
58 “More positively, the record suggests – even if it cannot 
prove – that the risk of nuclear disaster has been a source of 
welcome caution in international politics over the past seven 
decades.” (Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels, The Evo-
lution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th edition [London, 2019], x.) 
59 In a different context, Karl W. Deutsch described the 
interaction of the two components as follows: “Will is there-
fore ineffective without power; but power without will is 
only an effect without a goal.” (Karl W. Deutsch, Politische 
Kybernetik. Modelle und Perspektiven, 3rd edition [Freiburg, 
1973], 170 – my translation.) 
60 It thus includes both nuclear and non-nuclear options 
suitable for disarming strikes (e.g., cyber weapons, drones, 
hypersonic, and laser weapons). 
bilities of an opponent than to read their intentions 
and perception of one’s own readiness to retaliate. 
This subjective component would be of particular 
relevance in a conflict between nuclear-armed states. 
Threatening nuclear escalation or retaliation comes 
with a self-deterrent effect because carrying out the 
threat could result in mutual annihilation. 
This self-deterrent component forms the crux of 
the nuclear commitment the U.S. extends to its Euro-
pean allies.61 For an American president, the survival 
of his own country is paramount. Yet to protect Ameri-
can allies against a nuclear-armed aggressor, the 
latter must be unable to rule out that an American 
president might be willing to risk the survival of his 
own country for the protection of allies. 
This credibility dilemma notwithstanding, Ameri-
can extended deterrence has worked, both for Europe 
and Asia, where Japan and South Korea are U.S. nu-
clear protégés. Even though Taiwan has a less formal 
commitment it also benefits from American protec-
tion because if China dared attack Taiwan, it would 
be confronted with a nuclear-armed America. 
The United States has been able to provide extended 
deterrence protection because it is a global power with 
immense economic, technological, and military prow-
ess and unrivalled cultural and civilizational appeal. 
However, this status alone has not been considered 
sufficient. To render its nuclear commitment credible 
in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike, while keep-
ing the risk to the U.S. itself tolerable, American troops 
have been deployed on allied territory. In this way, 
even an attack that spared U.S. territory would still be 
tantamount to an aggression against the U.S. 
In order to minimize the existential risk inherent 
in its nuclear commitments, the U.S. needs nuclear 
options below the threshold of mutually devastating 
blows. This is reflected in the U.S. differentiating 
between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons 
and in planning for limited nuclear war. On the one 
hand, selective options might lower the nuclear thresh-
old by suggesting that nuclear war is controllable. On 
the other hand, it would be utterly irresponsible not 
to try to limit a nuclear war, even if such an attempt 
 
61 On the requirements and dilemmas of nuclear deter-
rence in general and extended deterrence in particular, see 
Eckhard Lübkemeier, Extended Deterrence: The American Nuclear 
Commitment to the Federal Republic of Germany, Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Freie Universität Berlin, 1990, Part I (Extended Deter-
rence: A Conceptual Analysis) and Part III (Managing Nuclear 
Peace). 
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might seem well-nigh impossible.62 Moreover, it 
would be fanciful to expect the U.S. to forgo limited 
options and not accord supreme priority to its own 
survival at the expense of allies.63 That is part of the 
price to pay for extended deterrence protection.64 
It could be argued that this also applies to French 
nuclear protection. After all, a major rationale of the 
Force de frappe is lack of trust in the reliability of 
the U.S. nuclear commitment, fuelled by the desire 
to preserve the core of national sovereignty, namely 
the ability to provide for its own defence. Thus, in the 
present circumstances, France would be unable to 
replace the U.S. as Europe’s nuclear guardian. What 
is lacking are the requisite military capabilities and, 
at least equally importantly, the credibility of a 
French nuclear commitment, both in the eyes of its 
European protégés and of potential adversaries. 
Enabling Europe to defend itself requires tackling 
both of these components. In terms of capabilities, 
Europe needs robust non-nuclear forces for the two 
main tasks of defence and intervention. However, as 
explained above, their size and composition are not 
 
62 “We usually think of deterrence as having failed if a 
major war ever occurs. And so it has; but it could fail worse 
if no effort were made to extend deterrence into war itself.” 
(Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence [New Haven and 
London, 1966], 191). 
63 Thus, the following speculative statement seems quite 
plausible: “Interestingly, the United States appears to have 
developed its own parallel plans for graduated escalation 
and tactical nuclear employment in the theater, separate 
from NATO’s options, though the details of the U.S. options 
(called POODLE BLANKET) remain classified. Those plans 
may have provided a way for the United States to conduct 
theater nuclear attacks even if NATO did not authorize 
NATO nuclear operations, but such conclusions must await 
eventual declassification.” (Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, 
The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution [Ithaca and London 2020], 
148). It would be unsurprising if this were still the case. 
64 Up till now, this also includes so-called nuclear sharing 
arrangements. Apart from Germany, American nuclear 
bombs are stored in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. 
Once authorised by the U.S. president, these bombs are to be 
delivered to their targets by aircraft of these host countries. 
As part of the American sub-strategic arsenal, the military 
utility of these weapons is marginal. Their principal purpose 
is political: they are an integral part of the intra-NATO bur-
den- and risk-sharing equation and they may give allied coun-
tries some, albeit limited influence on U.S. nuclear strategy. 
As long as this is the case, or at least is perceived as such, 
it would be counterproductive to demand their unilateral 
withdrawal. 
only a function of the capabilities of potential oppo-
nents. They are also determined by a political assess-
ment of present and future threats, as well as the 
appropriate strategies to deal with those threats. In 
any case, the bottom line is this: If Europe wanted 
to, it would have sufficient resources to mount an 
effective non-nuclear self-defence. 
An EU of nation-states is 
incompatible with European 
nuclear forces. 
In contrast, nuclear self-defence poses a far greater 
challenge. This is due to the revolutionary implications 
of nuclear weapons for war prevention and warfare 
as well as the political nature of the EU. As long as it 
remains a union of nation-states, no supranational 
European body will be entrusted with the decision 
regarding whether and how to employ nuclear weap-
ons. In these circumstances, a genuinely European 
nuclear force is impossible. 
However, there could and should be conventional 
European forces, which could even take the form of a 
single European army involving all or most of Europe’s 
national armies. A single force like this would not be 
deployed in one fell swoop; instead, it would be the 
outcome of a progressive integration of military capa-
bilities, driven forward by successful joint operations 
and a convergence of strategic cultures. Such Euro-
peanisation of national armies and doctrines would 
be characterised by ever-closer coordination of national 
planning processes and a growing division of labour, 
by joint procurement of capabilities and the establish-
ment of multinational units. Eventually, this could 
culminate in common forces under European mili-
tary command, while the decision on their deploy-
ment would remain with EU Member States.65 
In contrast, a nuclear deterrent for Europe cannot 
be created by pooling national nuclear capabilities. 
Such capabilities do not exist and must not be built, if 
 
65 Consequently, the fact that any participation of German 
armed forces in combat operations requires the approval 
of the German parliament (so-called “parliamentary reserva-
tion”) does not stand in the way of European conventional 
forces. Otherwise, Germany would be unable to take part 
in NATO operations either. However, what would have to 
change is Germany’s self-proclaimed “culture of military 
restraint”. If it were interpreted as restrictively as hitherto, 
German reliability would be questionable and thus impede 
an effective European self-defence even if Germany relaxed 
the parliamentary reservation or abolished it outright. 
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only because the nuclear proliferation involved would 
violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
With the exception of France, all EU states are non-
nuclear members of the NPT. The NPT as a global 
brake on proliferation must not be undermined by 
efforts to achieve European self-defence. 
Thus, only French nuclear forces would be capable 
of providing the nuclear backbone of European self-
defence. Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear capa-
bilities are unsuitable for fighting extended (counter-
force) duels. This is due to their destructiveness and 
associated escalatory impact: crossing the nuclear 
threshold would radically alter the risk perception of 
the parties involved in the conflict. It is this signalling 
effect rather than their war-fighting quality that dis-
tinguishes nuclear from conventional weapons. Con-
sequently, the size and composition of an opponent’s 
nuclear arsenal is much less relevant as a determi-
nant of a countervailing nuclear deterrent than their 
conventional forces are for an effective non-nuclear 
defence. With one crucial proviso: the combined con-
ventional and nuclear capabilities of an adversary 
must not give him a first-strike or disarmament 
option. Thus, a nuclear arsenal must be sufficiently 
invulnerable to confront an opponent with the bur-
den of having to incur an unacceptable risk when 
launching or continuing an aggression. 
A nuclear deterrent needs retaliatory 
as well as escalatory options. 
The threat or use of nuclear weapons should not 
be confined to a massive counterattack. If this were 
the sole option available, the self-deterrent effect of 
nuclear threats would entail a debilitating vulnerabil-
ity vis-à-vis an adversary capable of threatening or 
carrying out a limited aggression without losing their 
retaliatory capacity. Such a situation need not be 
deliberately provoked by an opponent. Wars can be 
triggered by conflicts spiralling out of control. In a 
war-prone confrontation, the side with no other op-
tion than a massive nuclear strike would be exposed 
to political coercion and thus at a significant dis-
advantage. 
Such reckoning does not imply planning for nuclear 
warfighting. The belief that once nuclear weapons are 
employed a war is unlikely to be kept within mutually 
acceptable bounds reinforces pre-war deterrence and 
its political acceptability. Still, it would be politically 
irresponsible to incur the risk of strategic vulnerabil-
ity and, should war erupt anyway, to desist from at-
tempting to prevent it escalating into mutual annihi-
lation. Both considerations suggest that, while nuclear 
deterrence requires limited deployment options, such 
flexibility need not be extensive and should not foster 
a reckless belief that war could be waged with apoca-
lyptic weapons.66 
Once a nuclear posture assures escalation and 
retaliation, it need not mirror an opponent’s arsenal. 
Yet capabilities alone do not make for an effective 
deterrent. The other ingredient is a readiness to carry 
out the threat of nuclear use. 
So far, France has been unwilling to replace the U.S. 
as Europe’s nuclear protector, and no such demand 
has been made of it either. European self-defence will 
only be possible if both sides change their minds: 
Paris must be ready to offer nuclear protection and its 
partners must request it. 
This will only happen if a French nuclear deterrent 
for Europe could be sufficiently credible for friend 
and foe alike. As noted earlier, what would constitute 
“sufficiently credible” is not predetermined by the mili-
tary capabilities of potential adversaries. Even if these 
capabilities could be accurately identified, whether 
and how they would perform in the event of war 
would be as hard to discern beforehand as an adver-
sary’s ability to use them efficiently and effectively. 
Taking military precautions against all even remotely 
conceivable threats and on the basis of worst-case 
 
66 Since nuclear weapons, unlike conventional systems, do 
not lend themselves to tit-for-tat duelling, there is no objec-
tive measure for the deterrent optimum between the two 
poles of a single retaliatory blow and a whole raft of escala-
tory options. Moscow allegedly plans for selective nuclear 
use as part of an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy (see Freed-
man and Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy [see note 
58], 635–39). How to thwart such a scheme is a policy issue 
rather than a purely military calculation. The starting point 
is to address the question of whether such plans are based 
on offensive or defensive intentions and how to influence 
Moscow’s corresponding perceptions. This political assess-
ment informs the decision on how many and what kind of 
selective military options are sufficient to neutralise Russian 
military capabilities and political objectives. While the choice 
between surrender or massive nuclear retaliation is unac-
ceptable, an actor’s own range of flexible employment 
options does not have to mimic an opponent’s capacity. The 
credibility of nuclear threats prior to and in the course of 
war depends on mutual perceptions of what is at stake and 
the risk each side is prepared to take. Thus, the flexibility 
of a nuclear arsenal is a, but by no means, the only deter-
minant of its deterrent potency. 
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assumptions will never be possible and any such 
attempt would carry prohibitive opportunity costs as 
well as the risk of fuelling rather than containing a 
conflict.67 
Whether for deterrence or defence, an overarching 
political strategy must govern the configuration and 
use of military means. It is one of four essential pre-
requisites for European self-defence. Answering the 
question: “How much is enough for what?” depends 
on such a strategy for guidance. 
This also applies to the question of how robust the 
conventional component of an independent European 
defence capability would have to be. The issue is in-
timately linked to the credibility of a French nuclear 
umbrella. Similar to America’s nuclear commitment, 
a French nuclear deterrent for Europe would need 
conventional capabilities strong and versatile enough 
to meet two basic requirements: maximise the risk an 
attacker would have to incur and minimise one’s own 
risk of having to choose between nuclear escalation 
or political surrender. 
The benchmark for European nuclear 
self-defence cannot and need not be 
America’s nuclear posture. 
In contrast, the analogy to the protection provided 
by the United States is considerably weaker in the 
nuclear sector. It would be misleading to take Ameri-
can nuclear capabilities as the gold standard for Euro-
pean nuclear self-defence. Otherwise, achieving such 
autonomy would be doomed from the outset. The 
French arsenal cannot come close to the magnitude 
and diversity of American nuclear capabilities. 
Even if technological and operational challenges 
could be overcome, political considerations would 
stand in the way of a massive upgrading. As France 
would be unable to finance this, its partners would 
have to fill the gap, including and especially Germany 
as the partner with the most financial power. Legally, 
such co-financing of French nuclear forces may even 
be allowed: “Germany’s current obligations enshrined 
in the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons] and the ‘Two-Plus-Four Treaty’ are limited 
to prohibiting the country from acquiring its own 
nuclear weapons (‘German bomb’).” According to this 
 
67 “If the worst is assumed by everyone, it is difficult to 
make preparations at all, and impossible to pay for them.” 
(Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race. Disarmament and Arms 
Control in the Missile Age [London: IISS, 1961], 90). 
view, the co-financing of foreign nuclear weapons 
would not be ruled out by the nuclear treaties.68 
Yet the notion of Germany subsidising French 
nuclear forces is unrealistic. Even if subsidies were 
provided without a quid pro quo and the decision to 
use nuclear weapons remained the exclusive preroga-
tive of the French president, the credibility of such 
an assurance would be questionable. This would dent 
the integrity of the NPT which prohibits nuclear-weap-
on states from transferring the control of nuclear 
weapons and prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states 
from receiving such control.69 
But assuming this risk were eliminated or accepted 
– a massive nuclear re-armament on the part of 
France would still be politically counterproductive. 
In particular if, as argued in this study, European em-
powerment would not lead to the dissolution of NATO 
but to its restructuring on the basis of symmetrical 
interdependence. Potential adversaries such as Russia 
could see a substantive upgrading of the French nu-
clear arsenal as a hostile move and take political and 
military countermeasures. With tensions and distrust 
rising, the prospect of arms control and disarmament 
could dwindle, straining European-American rela-
tions and exacerbating intra-European conflicts. 
So, could France become Europe’s nuclear protec-
tor without massively upgrading its Force de frappe? 
This question goes to the very heart of what would 
have to constitute the foundation of European self-
defence: shared European identity and mutual soli-
darity. These two values are the prerequisites as well 
as driving forces of a demand for French nuclear pro-
tection and a French willingness to provide such 
protection. 
Currently, there is neither demand nor supply. 
Demand and supply will only be forthcoming if 
Europe continues to grow together and European 
identity and solidarity rapidly progress. Thus, as long 
as EU partners continue to argue over the distribution 
of refugees, they will be even less willing to rely on 
one another when their national existence is at stake. 
And, in the absence of a stable monetary union, bol-
 
68 Deutscher Bundestag, Research Services, Völkerrechtliche 
Verpflichtungen Deutschlands beim Umgang mit Kernwaffen. 
Deutsche und europäische Ko-Finanzierung ausländischer Nuklear-
waffenpotentiale, WD 2-3000-013/17 (Berlin, 23 May 2017), 
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/513080/c9a903735d5
ea334181c2f946d2cf8a2/wd-2-013-17-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 
16 March 2020). 
69 Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen (NVV), Art. I 
and II, quoted in ibid. 
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stered by Member States assuming their collective 
responsibility for their common currency, such trust 
will not flourish either. 
In a community of fate, France could 
be Europe’s nuclear protector. 
Unshakable faith in the reliability of others is not 
something that develops overnight when national 
survival is at stake. It needs an intertwining of inter-
ests and a shared European identity, nurtured by the 
tangible benefits of European solidarity and coopera-
tion. In the course of such a process, politico-military 
integration is both an end and a means. The develop-
ment and procurement of common capabilities, arma-
ments cooperation, and joint military operations not 
only promote military integration but integration as 
a whole. Conversely, successful cooperation and fair 
burden-sharing along the entire spectrum of Euro-
pean policy areas facilitate confidence-building and 
integration in the area of defence, too. Given this 
interlinkage, a (self-)defence union is an integral part 
of a wider political union. However, the assertion that 
a fully-fledged political union is a precondition for 
independent European defence70 underestimates the 
reciprocal relationship between the creation of a 
defence union and a political one. 
Nevertheless, a nuclear deterrent for Europe 
based on French nuclear forces would be the capstone 
rather than driver of a political union. For it to be 
credible in the eyes of potential adversaries, tolerable 
to France as the protector, and reassuring to its Euro-
pean protégés, France and its European partners 
would have to share a rock-solid perception that they 
belong to an enduring community of fate. 
This requirement does not contradict the premise 
of this study that Europe will remain a union of 
nation-states. For all its attendant shortcomings, risks, 
and costs, extended deterrence provided by the U.S. 
has worked even though the country is separated 
from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean. In principle, what 
has been possible in such circumstances should not 
 
70 “[...] a common West European defence can come only 
after a political union has been established that approaches 
in cohesion, political authority and identity the traditional 
nation-state” (Christoph Bertram, “Western Europe’s Strategic 
Role: Towards a European Pillar?” in The Changing Strategic 
Landscape, ed. François Heisbourg [London: IISS, 1989], 104–
13). 
be impossible when protector and protégés share 
the same continent. 
More importantly, NATO and the EU are funda-
mentally different. Unlike NATO, the EU is not an 
international organisation, but a hybrid of supra-
national and international strands, neither a feder-
alised state nor a loose association of states; rather, 
Europe is a political entity sui generis.71 If Europe 
is to be able to defend itself, replacing its American 
nuclear protector with a French one, it will have to 
evolve into a community of fate bound by a sense 
of togetherness and a web of interdependencies un-
attainable for an intergovernmental organisation like 
NATO.72 Taking this crucial difference into account 
sheds a different light on the possibility of a French 
nuclear umbrella for Europe. The benchmark can 
then no longer be the extended deterrent provided 
by the USA. In contrast to the U.S., the security, pros-
perity, and sovereignty of France are bound up with 
its European partners. Geography alone ensures that 
France cannot escape this interlinkage: unlike the 
U.S., France has European neighbours. 
Like the EU itself, Europe’s model of 
nuclear deterrence would be unique. 
Even more important than geography, however, is 
the integrative fabric consisting of European identity 
and solidarity, as well as converging national inter-
ests. The authority to decide on nuclear use could not 
be shared among Europeans but would remain with 
the French president, and since his primary loyalty has 
to be with the French citizens electing him, France’s 
European partners would still not be guaranteed the 
same measure of nuclear protection as France proper. 
But the ensuing uncertainty would be incomparably 
smaller in a European community of fate than in the 
context of NATO. This is due not to ill will on the part 
of the U.S. but to geography and the distinctive nature 
of the EU setting it apart from an intergovernmental 
organisation like NATO. The U.S. is a protective power 
for Europe, but not of Europe. 
 
71 Note that there is still no commonly accepted term for 
the “constitutional” setup of the European Union.  
72 The fact that few Europeans (or Americans, for that 
matter) have a transatlantic identity, whereas many consider 
themselves as having a European identity in addition to their 
national identities illustrates this fundamental difference 
between the EU and NATO. 
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Integrated deterrence 
What would it take for a French nuclear umbrella 
to be credible, tolerable, and reassuring? Crucially, 
compared to the U.S., the political requirements for 
meeting these criteria are more demanding than 
the military ones. The USA can “only” offer extended 
deterrence, France must and would offer more: 
“must” because otherwise it could not replace the 
U.S. as Europe’s nuclear protector, and “would” 
because its peace and security, prosperity and politi-
cal sovereignty are inextricably linked to its European 
neighbours. Just as there is no standard term for the 
political (i.e., constitutional) nature of the EU, there 
is, as yet, no term for the specific nature of French 
nuclear protection under these conditions: neither 
extended deterrence as provided by the U.S., nor 
primary or homeland deterrence, which is reserved 
for the nation-state proper. This third kind of deter-
rence could be referred to as integrated deterrence: 
deterrence for and by a community of states bolstered 
by far-reaching inter- and supranational integration.73 
What extend and kind of nuclear capabilities 
France would need for integrated deterrence would 
ultimately have to be determined by France and its 
European partners. However, given the unique char-
acter of Europe’s political union a massive build-up 
of nuclear weapons to the American level would be 
neither necessary nor desirable. 
In addition to retaliatory and escalatory capabil-
ities, integrated deterrence would have a third re-
quirement: political-military participation. In NATO, 
this is achieved through the nuclear sharing arrange-
ment. Similarly, French nuclear weapons would also 
be based in partner countries. As in NATO, where the 
U.S. president would have to release American nu-
clear weapons for delivery by European allies, their 
 
73 Similarly, Bruno Tertrais raises the possibility of such 
a novel type of deterrence in proposing the prospect of a 
French declaration to the effect that the mutual assistance 
clause of the EU treaty would be honoured by all means, 
including French nuclear weapons: "This would not be an 
‘extended’ deterrence in the traditional sense of the term.” 
(Bruno Tertrais, The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: 
French and British Policies and Future Scenarios [Helsinki: Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 2018], https://www. 
fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/wp106_tertrais_european_ 
nuclear_deterrence.pdf [accessed 10 June 2020]). However, he 
does not elaborate on the political underpinning needed to 
render such a declaration credible to partners and opponents 
alike. 
use with France as the protector would require a 
decision by the French president. Unlike in NATO, 
however, the delivery systems could be provided not 
only by individual allies but also by designated units 
of joint European forces. 
However, an integrated deterrent could be effective 
without such military arrangements, while some 
measure of political participation would be indispen-
sable. In NATO, the Nuclear Planning Group was 
created to make America’s nuclear strategy more 
transparent to allies and to enable them to bring their 
interests to bear. The extent to which this happens 
is unknown to the general public. In the case of Euro-
pean self-defence propped up by a French nuclear 
deterrent, however, such political participation could 
and would have to be much more extensive than 
would be expected in extended deterrence contingen-
cies. As it would constitute a breach of the NPT, there 
could be no infringement of the French president’s 
decision-making monopoly (e.g., by means of a “sec-
ond key” granted to partners). Below this threshold, 
however, consultative mechanisms could be estab-
lished, military personnel from non-nuclear partners 
could act as liaison officers with French nuclear forces, 
and a “doctrine of integrated deterrence” could be 
developed in joint White Papers. 
What should be done? 
After World War II, barely anyone would have dared 
predict that Germany and the victims of Nazi aggres-
sion would be able to create a peace community 
grounded in an unprecedented level of integration 
and reciprocal confidence in non-violent conflict reso-
lution. And yet, in 2012, the EU was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize. Unique circumstances made Euro-
pean unity possible, but it was not down to circum-
stances alone. It took bold political leadership to har-
ness them for the common European good and thus 
draw peace-building lessons from Europe’s war-torn 
history of the first half of the twentieth century. 
Similarly, it will take political will to empower 
Europe to defend itself. As described, the costs and 
risks of Europe’s dependence on the U.S. and several 
recent developments favour European self-reliance, 
and its requirements (“What must be done?”) could 
be met (“What could be done?”). But to underestimate 
the magnitude of the challenges would be courting 
failure. Of these challenges, financial constraints do 
not pose an insurmountable obstacle. European self-
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defence implies a mutual readiness to engage in a 
relationship of existential dependency. To be crisis-
proof, such readiness must be consistently and reli-
ably backed by Europe’s citizens. The task of political 
leadership is not only to build on popular support, 
but to also nurture that support by showing courage, 
steadfastness, and a willingness to spend political 
capital. 
Costs and risks must be 
identified and discussed. 
Only those in power can lead. In a democracy, 
power requires an electoral mandate. Exercising lead-
ership when public opinion is unfavourable can only 
be expected if national interests outweigh the costs 
and risks. In this section we will therefore discuss fre-
quent objections against striving for European defence 
autonomy. 
Too little Europeanism 
The crisis-ridden monetary union is a reminder that 
European self-defence requires a far-reaching con-
vergence of national interests and mentalities. Heed-
ing this lesson does not imply that a self-defence 
union presupposes a European federal state: The EU 
would not have come into existence or would have 
disintegrated during one of its crises if other types of 
political entity than the nation-state or a federal state 
were not possible. 
However, the question remains whether a common 
European identity that is weaker than separate national 
identities can be strong enough to sustain a European 
self-defence union. Referring to monetary union, 
Peter Graf Kielmansegg asserts: “The European Union, 
and this will not change, must live with legitimacy 
and solidarity remaining scarce resources.”74 But 
there is no way of determining just how scarce these 
resources really are at any given moment. More im-
portantly, the “reservoir” of common interests and 
European identity is not static, it can grow or shrink 
over time. As there is no fixed upper limit to its size, 
it is in the hands of the EU Member States and insti-
tutions themselves to expand this “reservoir” through 
 
74 Peter Graf Kielmansegg, “Europa. Neu denken”, FAZ, 
20 April 2020, 6 (my translation). 
policies and projects that deliver tangible benefits 
to Europe’s citizens.75 
Insufficient resources 
Europe would have to spend more on defence if it 
wanted to stand on its own feet. The extra expendi-
ture required is influenced by a host of different fac-
tors, with the military capabilities of potential adver-
saries being a decisive, but not the sole factor. In any 
case, military instruments have to be part and parcel 
of a political strategy that accords priority to pre-
venting and resolving conflicts through non-military 
incentives and sanctions, while backed up by the 
threat and use of military means when necessary. If 
Europe had to provide for its own defence because 
the U.S. withdrew from NATO, it could raise the requi-
site funds and manpower. Hence, whether it should do 
so in the absence of such a Pearl Harbor-like shock is 
not a financial, but a political question, the bottom 
line of which is the value Europeans attach to being 
fully sovereign. 
Lack of credibility 
Self-defence requires a mixture of conventional and 
nuclear capabilities. As explained above, prevailing 
circumstances are such that only French forces could 
be the nuclear arm of a European self-defence pos-
ture. A massive build-up of French nuclear capabili-
ties is politically impossible, as is depriving the French 
president of his decision-making monopoly. If, like 
America’s today, a French nuclear commitment 
remained within the realm of extended deterrence, its 
credibility would be doubtful. Thus, European self-
defence with French nuclear forces is only feasible if 
it is preceded and sustained by a substantially deeper 
and broader level of European integration, which 
would have to include an alignment of strategic cul-
tures. Then, a new kind of deterrent could emerge, 
which would be neither extended nor primary deter-
rence. This integrated deterrent could be credible as the 
 
75 Against the backdrop of the corona pandemic, Schäuble 
postulates: “The European community of fate is especially 
forged in times of crisis. Identities are not set in stone, they 
can change as a result of challenges met successfully together.” 
(Wolfgang Schäuble, “Aus eigener Stärke”, FAZ, 6 July 2020, 
6 – my translation). 
 What should be done? 
 SWP Berlin 
 Standing on Our Own Feet? 
 February 2021 
 31 
nuclear backbone of a European self-defence 
capacity.76 
Hazardous transition 
Were the U.S. to abruptly withdraw its pledge of 
protection, European self-defence would have to be 
created overnight. Yet in such a worst-case scenario, 
the opposite might in fact happen: a national “every 
man for himself” scramble that would spell the end 
of European unity. Betting on a Pearl Harbor-type 
shock would therefore be irresponsible. 
In contrast, bolstering European defence capabil-
ities up to the point of self-reliance would be an 
undertaking set in train and fostered by a series of 
deliberate political decisions. Such a process, so the 
objection goes, could risk creating a fatal security gap 
by prematurely corroding American protection when 
it is still needed. In this scenario, driving the process 
forward would be distrust of America’s reliability or 
fear that Washington could exploit the vulnerability 
of its European “protégés”. According to this argu-
ment, this could trigger a detrimental self-fulfilling 
prophecy that would further exacerbate transatlantic 
tensions and be grist to the mills of American isola-
tionists or unilateralists calling for American security 
commitments to Europe to be rescinded. 
This risk cannot be denied. Therefore, every effort 
should be made to develop European defence autono-
my in lockstep with Washington. After all, such 
European emancipation is also in the interests of the 
U.S. A Europe that could stand on its own feet would 
free up American resources for domestic or global 
use, above all to deal with China from a position of 
economic and technological strength. On the one 
hand, a Europe shedding its defence dependency might 
be a more recalcitrant partner, on the other, it would 
also be a stronger partner in helping a reinvigorated 
“West” to promote a sustainable, cooperative and 
rules-based international order. 
 
76 Admittedly, “credibility” is an inherently elusive con-
cept. The standard dictionary of the German language 
(Duden) defines “credible” as “appearing true, correct, reli-
able, and thus justifying belief in it”. The effect of a nuclear 
deterrent threat depends on the perception of its addressee 
who either does or does not believe that the threat would 
actually be carried out. This is something undetectable from 
the outside. All the more so since even the party to be de-
terred may not be certain about what to believe or not to 
believe until the point at which a decision about what action 
to take is required. 
Trump’s America is not a partner in this. Yet 
there is still another America that already under 
President Kennedy was prepared to agree on a trans-
atlantic “Declaration of Interdependence” based on 
full equality. If this were not the case, there would be 
one more reason to strive for European self-defence. 
Certainly, it would be more difficult to minimise the 
risk described here. But Washington would still retain 
a vested interest in Europe: as a major trading and 
investment partner as well as ally vis-à-vis China, as a 
partner in shaping the global order, and as a valuable 
component of America’s global military network. Last 
but not least, the U.S. has more common interests, 
values, and history with Europe than with any other 
part of the world. 
Nevertheless, a residual risk would remain. This 
also applies, albeit to a much lesser extent, to the 
Kennedy-style cooperative scenario. On the other side 
of the ledger, there are the structural and other cur-
rent factors speaking in favour of a fully sovereign 
Europe. Whether they outweigh the risk is a matter of 
judgement and not something that can be scientifically 
proven. 
Provoking European divisions 
Currently, there is no widespread support within and 
among EU Member States for empowering Europe to 
defend itself. And unless the U.S. were to unexpectedly 
renege on its commitment enshrined in Article 5 of 
the NATO treaty, this is unlikely to change soon. It 
could therefore be argued that propagating European 
self-defence would strain EU cohesion at a time when, 
in addition to grappling with the stabilisation of the 
euro architecture, unresolved migratory challenges, 
populism, and rule of law deficiencies, the Union has 
also been severely hit by the fallout of the corona 
pandemic.77 
While this objection must be taken seriously, it 
does not imply relinquishing a project being pursued 
for all the compelling reasons expounded earlier.78 
Those who do not want to join cannot claim a right 
of veto. 
 
77 On Europe’s many lingering crises, see Eckhard Lübke-
meier, Europas Banalität des Guten. Ursachen der europäischen 
Dauerkrise und Auswege – ein Wegweiser (Europe’s Banality of the 
Good. A guide to the causes of Europe’s crises and how to overcome 
them), SWP Studie 6/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 2019). 
78 See “Why Revisit the Topic of European Defence 
Autonomy?” 
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Yet a disintegrating Europe is incongruous with a 
sovereign Europe. Advocates of European self-defence 
must therefore proceed with caution and follow a 
series of guidelines, including exemplary adherence 
to treaties and rules; readiness to compromise and 
extend solidarity; stabilisation of the monetary union 
as a pillar of a sovereign Europe; strengthening of the 
internal market; concerted and sustained promotion 
of economic recovery from the corona crisis; open-
ness to selective participation of non-members; com-
mitment to transatlantic partnership in general and 
NATO in particular.79 
This applies to Germany and France in particular. 
Given their political, economic, and military weight, 
these two countries constitute the critical mass. The 
viability of any major European project, and certainly 
an endeavour as sweeping and disruptive as European 
self-defence, requires their active encouragement. In 
Article 14 of the Franco-German Aachen Treaty con-
cluded on 22 January 2019, Germany and France pro-
fessed that “their security interests are inseparably 
linked” and agreed on an assistance clause which is 
more binding than Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and 
which, unlike Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty (TEU), 
explicitly states that assistance would include military 
means, as well. 
Germany and France face a dilemma: Due to their 
collective weight and because, rather than in spite 
of their differences, they are Europe’s indispensable 
duo, putting them in a position of primi inter pares 
that can evoke feelings of unease among their EU 
partners. The duo cannot escape the dilemma, but 
they can attenuate it by striving to enlist as many 
like-minded partners as possible;80 by adhering to 
 
79 The issue of NATO commitment is not only important 
given the position of EU members such as Poland and the 
Baltic states, which given their reading of the Russian threat, 
are particularly intent on leaving no doubt about continued 
American backing. As long as there are recurrent hostilities 
between Greece and Turkey, their joint membership in an 
American-led NATO contributes to containing this long-
standing conflict. 
80 It is not really possible to identify these partners in 
advance, i.e., before France and Germany agree on the 
project and thus force their European partners to take sides. 
There would, however, have to be partners who also belong 
to the currency union, currently the most de-nationalised 
part of the EU architecture and with the greatest potential 
for furthering the broad-based integration that a viable self-
defence posture requires. There could also be non-euro coun-
the aforementioned guidelines, as well as by leading 
through example, i.e., demonstrating that they are 
determined to advance their bilateral integration and 
take joint military action.81 
Equally important, the best should not be made 
the enemy of the good. Europe must improve its mili-
tary capacity to act. Washington will insist on this, 
and the EU Member States are agreed that it is the 
order of the day. Where there is no consensus, how-
ever, is on whether empowering Europe militarily 
should extend beyond Europe being more rather than 
fully autonomous. 
This disunity should not deter the advocates of 
European self-defence, however. In any case, their 
goal cannot be achieved in one fell swoop, but only 
through progressively increasing Europe’s defence 
autonomy. Thus, the projects agreed in the PESCO 
framework, the European Intervention Initiative 
launched by France, as well as bilateral and multi-
lateral armament programs and joint operations 
all serve the purpose, even in the absence of a com-
monly agreed final objective, and as such should be 
strongly supported by proponents of European self-
defence. 
In doing so, these advocates should, however, 
make no bones about their ultimate goal. Any attempt 
to obfuscate their long-term intentions would be 
doomed to fail and sow distrust, which would hamper 
embedding the project into an overarching strategy 
designed to foster further European integration and 
reinvigorate the transatlantic partnership. The evolu-
tion of the EU has been made possible by projects and 
policies such as the euro or the Schengen Area, which 
some members chose not to join. A Europe that has 
expanded to a union of 27 nation-states cannot func-
tion without differentiated integration, i.e., the possi-
bility of not everyone taking part in everything. Both 
sides must respect this systemic requirement: those 
who want to integrate further and those who, at least 
initially, do not. 
Conclusion: European self-defence is a visionary project 
that comes with costs and risks. These must be clearly 
identified and rigorously debated lest the vision 
becomes an illusion. Yet Europe’s inability to defend 
 
tries, but any EU states clinging onto their neutrality status 
would be ineligible. 
81 The Franco-German Brigade is a case in point. Estab-
lished in 1988 as a role model for Franco-German military 
integration, it has never been employed in toto. 
 What should be done? 
 SWP Berlin 
 Standing on Our Own Feet? 
 February 2021 
 33 
itself also carries costs and risks that could increase 
even further, and as long as it depends on American 
protection, Europe can never be fully sovereign. 
Should Europe be willing to pay the price of shaking 
off its dependency and turn the transatlantic security 
relationship into a symmetrical partnership of equals? 
There is no one answer to this, but, before taking a 
political decision, the pros and cons should be the 
subject of a public debate. This chapter has tried to 
provide an informed background for such a debate. 
I will now set out my answer to the question in the 
concluding chapter. 
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For Chancellor Merkel, Europe’s “task of the future” 
is to take its destiny into its own hands.82 To do so, 
Europe must be able to provide for its own defence. 
Such autonomy neither implies autarky nor the dis-
solution of NATO and the end of the transatlantic 
partnership. What it does require is status parity. 
Since World War II and notwithstanding the demise 
of the Cold War, European-American relations have 
been characterised by asymmetrical interdependence. 
Even though the U.S. benefits from NATO and its 
military facilities and troops based in Europe, there 
remains a fundamental disparity: the U.S. does not 
depend on European assistance for its core national 
security, it cannot and will not relinquish its autonomy. 
Europe, in contrast, does not have this autonomy as 
it relies on an American defence backstop. The U.S. 
is the protector, Europe the protégé. 
For decades, this arrangement has enabled Europe 
to not only survive but prosper under America’s pro-
tective mantle. But unilateral dependency inevitably 
comes at a price. The West’s community of values 
and convergence of interests, its economic success 
and the NATO alliance have made that price bearable 
for both Europe and its American protector. All the 
more so because there was no viable alternative: 
Europe was too weak and divided to stand on its own 
feet, while Washington had a strategic interest in 
Europe and an alliance with Europe in which it was 
primus inter pares. 
In essence, after more than 70 years this is still the 
case. However, is this arrangement sustainable and 
even if it is – should it be maintained? Not only Chan-
cellor Merkel but also others like her have raised 
doubts about its durability,83 prompted by the devel-
 
82 Speech by Chancellor Merkel [see note 40]. 
83 Ibid.; for two academic voices, see Freedman and 
Michaels: “The weakest link in the whole nuclear order 
remains extended deterrence, the requirement that the 
United States accepts the risk of nuclear war on behalf of 
opments described above and by the structural 
incentive inherent in a relationship of asymmetrical 
interdependence: “Guaranteeing protection from out-
side threats, being able to defend yourself, however, 
is a prerequisite and the innermost core of the sover-
eignty of states.”84 
Thus, sovereignty and mastering one’s own destiny 
go hand in hand. In Europe, such sovereignty can only 
be attained collectively. On a global scale, even large 
European states are no more than middleweights. For 
European nation-states to gain parity with global state 
or non-state actors such as Google, Amazon, or Face-
book, they have to pool their resources through Euro-
pean integration. Thanks to the EU’s internal market, 
a common currency, and its technological prowess, 
Europe is an economic and regulatory power with 
global reach. But the giant has an Achilles’ heel: 
Unlike the U.S., Europe cannot provide for its own 
defence. 
Eliminating this vulnerability requires political 
stamina, considerable investment, and a Europe that 
continues to grow together. European identity and 
solidarity based on the convergence of national inter-
ests are the key ingredients of a European community 
of nation-states: a historically unique entity in which 
nation-states do not fade away but engage in a sweep-
ing collectivisation of competences. 
Embedded in such a community, Europe’s capacity 
for self-defence could gradually expand. Such a pro-
cess would cast a different light on the crucial ques-
tion of how to substitute the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 
 
its allies. The fact that these guarantees have stayed in place 
for over sixty years is impressive, but it is a long time since 
they have been tested, and their foundations are becoming 
more fragile” (The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy [see note 58], 678). 
84 Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, Überlegungen 
zur europäischen Politik, 1 September 1994, https://www.bundes 
finanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/schaeuble-
lamers-papier-1994.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 (accessed 
18 July 2020 – my translation). 
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After all, as long as there is a risk of having to con-
front a nuclear-armed adversary, Europe cannot be 
sovereign without its own nuclear deterrent. 
Unlike the intergovernmental NATO, the EU is a 
political hybrid of both inter- and supranational com-
ponents. Europe’s unique setup lends itself to an 
unprecedented type of nuclear protection: no longer 
the extended deterrence provided by an external 
power, but not yet the primary deterrence, which is 
reserved for the nation-state proper. This novel type 
of nuclear deterrence might be referred to as inte-
grated deterrence. As in extended deterrence contin-
gencies, the efficacy of integrated deterrence would 
depend on meeting three criteria of deterring a poten-
tial opponent, reassuring a protégé, and being toler-
able to a nuclear protector. Yet unlike extended 
deterrence in the context of NATO’s looser association 
of nation-states, Europe’s broader and deeper integra-
tion would place less stringent demands on the scale 
and quality of its nuclear deterrent. Thus, a close-knit 
Europe could eventually be protected by an integrated 
French nuclear deterrent that would not have to fulfil 
the more exacting requirements of extended deter-
rence. Consequently, in terms of scale and sophisti-
cation, the French arsenal would not have to mirror 
America’s.85 
The validity of this argument could be disputed 
on several grounds. The weakest counterargument 
employs the benchmark of extended deterrence. Such 
reference fails to recognise geography and the differ-
ences between the nature of NATO and the EU: If the 
U.S. were a European neighbour and a member of 
the EU, NATO allies would have been spared some 
of the bitter controversies about transatlantic bur-
den-sharing and the requirements for a credible U.S. 
nuclear commitment.86 
A second objection is that there is neither a de-
mand for nor an offer of French nuclear protection 
for European self-defence. While this has been and 
remains the case, the status quo is not immutable. 
 
85 For an elaboration of the concept of integrated deterrence 
see p. 29. 
86 In such hypothetical circumstances it would, for exam-
ple, have been virtually impossible to differentiate between 
strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons as Washington 
and Moscow have done. As explained in footnote 5, this dis-
tinction served as a trigger for the transatlantic debate in the 
late 1970s about a deterrence gap allegedly caused by Soviet 
deployment of intermediate-range and thus “sub-strategic” 
SS-20 missiles. Then German chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
was a major proponent of this thesis. 
Perhaps Europe will never be able or willing to eman-
cipate itself from reliance on American protection. 
But only a sustained attempt to do so can prove or 
disprove this. 
Political will would have to 
pave the way. 
Europe would have the economic, technological, 
and financial resources to develop and deploy an 
effective self-defence. The key question is whether 
it could and should muster the political will. 
Certainly, the path would still be challenging and 
demanding, requiring the creation of a European 
community of fate through far-reaching integration 
and cooperation. While not free of conflict, its steadily 
reinforced foundation of trust and solidarity would 
reassure its members of the solidity of their mutual 
defence commitments. 
Not all EU Member States would participate from 
the outset. Who is willing to be a first-mover would 
only become apparent once there was an initiative 
and this would have to come from Germany and 
France. They are European heavyweights capable of 
being the critical mass of a self-defence project and 
with Brexit, France is Europe’s only nuclear-armed 
power. European defence autonomy does not require 
identical strategic cultures, but it can only be achieved 
if there is a greater convergence of German and 
French strategic cultures, i.e., their approaches to the 
role of arms and armed forces in Europe’s foreign and 
security policy. Such convergence cannot involve the 
unilateral adoption of French views by Germany, nor 
would it have to. While France is the nuclear monopo-
list, it cannot claim the same supremacy that the U.S. 
holds within in NATO. France cannot escape its geo-
strategic destiny of being a direct neighbour of Ger-
many, a country that outstrips France in terms of eco-
nomic and technological prowess. 
Still, the necessary convergence of Franco-German 
strategic cultures will demand a great deal of Ger-
many and its entrenched “culture of military restraint”, 
in terms of defence spending, arms exports, and 
deployment of armed forces.87 Germany’s observation 
 
87 “If we are serious about common European defence, 
then all those involved must be prepared to question their 
own traditional positions and practices and adjust them to 
a certain extent [...] We Germans must understand that it is 
not only our domestic thinking about such questions that is 
at issue but also our ability to be a reliable ally” (Wolfgang 
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that military means do not solve conflicts is accurate 
and is also an appropriate admonition to prioritise 
conflict prevention and resolution using instruments 
other than military. But as long as there are actors 
who do not heed this admonition and continue to 
threaten or use force, these actors would enjoy a stra-
tegic advantage if they did not have to expect armed 
resistance. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” could 
not be dealt with diplomatically, it had to be defeated 
militarily. When Russia acts as an aggressor, as it did 
by annexing the Crimean peninsula or is still doing in 
eastern Ukraine, and as long as it commits war crimes 
in Syria, no level of trust in Russia can develop that 
would obviate the need for military protection from 
it. The EU is a peace community in which wars have 
become unthinkable. A global peace community is a 
desirable but still unrealistic vision, and since nuclear 
weapons cannot be uninvented, a nuclear deterrent 
capability remains indispensable.88 
In the land of Clausewitz, the public and scholarly 
debate on the military dimension of strategy has atro-
phied.89 Referring to Germany, Peter Rudolf notes: 
“Today, it seems that the talk of nuclear weapons as 
‘political weapons’ serves mainly to evade a discus-
sion on nuclear deterrence.”90 In the past, defence 
postures and their mixture of conventional and nu-
clear forces had been the subject of sustained and 
controversial debates, starting with Germany’s 
rearmament in the 1950s, the role of U.S. nuclear 
weapons for deterrence and defence against Soviet 
aggression in the 1960s and ‘70s and how to respond 
 
Schäuble, “Humboldt-Rede zu Europa”, 5 December 2019, 
https://bit.ly/3jeVP0j [accessed 18 July 2020] – my trans-
lation). 
88 More generally, this applies to all weaponry and the use 
of force: “Short of universal brain surgery, nothing can erase 
the memory of weapons and how to build them. If ‘total dis-
armament’ could make war unlikely, it would have to be by 
reducing incentives. The most primitive war could be mod-
ernized by rearmament” (Schelling, Arms and Influence [see 
note 62], 248). 
89 2020 marks his 240th birthday. Michael Howard, his-
torian and co-founder of the IISS, has written a vade mecum 
about Clausewitz’ seminal work Vom Kriege, in which he 
opens with: “About Karl von Clausewitz’s study On War the 
American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie has made the 
bold statement ‘His is not simply the greatest, but the only 
great book about war.’ It is difficult to disagree” (Michael 
Howard, Clausewitz [Oxford and New York, 1983], 1). 
90 Peter Rudolf, Deutschland, die Nato und die nukleare Abschre-
ckung, SWP-Studie 11/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, May 2020), 23. 
to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in the 
1980s.91 
When the communist empire imploded and the 
Cold War ended, a “New World Order” and a “New 
Age of Democracy, Peace and Unity”92 appeared to 
be within reach. Even in Europe, however, just a few 
years later, wars erupted in the former Yugoslavia, 
resulting in the first ever combat mission of the Ger-
man Bundeswehr in 1999. After September 11, 2001, 
the Bundeswehr was deployed to Afghanistan as part 
of an “out of area” NATO mission. Since then, Ger-
many has contributed to military operations against 
the “Islamic State”, in Mali and elsewhere. Russian 
aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine rekindled 
the need to reinforce territorial and alliance defence 
capabilities. In addition, President Trump has reck-
lessly and deliberately called into question the reli-
ability of America’s commitment to NATO, while an 
assertive China stokes Sino-American rivalry. 
Thus, Germany’s strategic environment has be-
come more unstable, threatening, and challenging. 
However, the level and intensity of the strategic 
debate have not kept pace with these changes. It takes 
intellectual and political courage to draw both ambi-
tious and uncomfortable conclusions regarding Ger-
many’s security, alliance, and European policy.93 
The conclusion advanced in this study is that, like 
the U.S., Europe should be able to defend itself. To 
achieve European defence autonomy, political leaders 
must adopt it as their objective. Germany and France 
must lead by example and intensify their bilateral 
 
91 See, e.g., Helmut Schmidt, Verteidigung oder Vergeltung 
(Stuttgart, 1961); K.-Peter Stratmann, NATO-Strategie in der 
Krise? Militärische Optionen von NATO und Warschauer Pakt in 
Mitteleuropa (Baden-Baden, 1981), and Uwe Nerlich and Trutz 
Rendtorff, eds., Nukleare Abschreckung – Politische und ethische 
Interpretationen einer neuen Realität (Baden-Baden, 1989). 
92 Title of the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, adopted 
by the states participating in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in November 1990. 
93 This applies primarily to political leaders (government, 
parliament, parties), but also to experts in the media and 
academia. For its latest Coalition Explorer, the European Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations (ECFR) asked members of the foreign 
and security policy elites in all EU Member States about their 
political priorities: defence was ranked 14th on the list of Ger-
man priorities while it came first in France (Jana Puglierin 
and Ulrike Esther Franke, The Big Engine that Might: How France 
and Germany Can Build a Geopolitical Europe [London: ECFR, July 
2020], 27, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the_big_engine_that_ 
might_how_france_and_germany.pdf [accessed 14 August 
2020]). 
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integration in the political, economic, and military 
spheres. A Franco-German community of fate could 
be the nucleus and serve as a catalyst for a European 
(self-) defence union. 
But even if this ultimate goal were unattainable, a 
Franco-German underpinning of the European Union 
serves Germany’s main interest in a strong and united 
Europe. Moreover, it would offer Germany a nuclear 
back-up that would render it less dependent on 
Washington, thus reinforcing its national security.94 
President Macron has called on his European partners 
to engage in a strategic dialogue on the role of nuclear 
deterrence for their common security.95 Germany and 
France had already resolved to carry out such a dia-
logue in 1996.96 Nearly a quarter of a century later, 
Germany should take up President Macron’s offer and 
expand the agenda to include a dialogue on how 
Europe could achieve defence autonomy and thus 
become fully sovereign at long last. 
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94 See Eckhard Lübkemeier, “Wir brauchen Paris als nu-
kleare Rückversicherung”, FAZ, 15 March 2019, 8. 
95 Présidence de la République, “Speech of the President of 
the Republic on the Defence and Deterrence Strategy”, Paris, 
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96 “Our two countries are ready to engage in a dialogue on 
the role of nuclear deterrence in the context of European 
defence policy” (The German Government, Gemeinsame Erklä-
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